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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Microfoundations of Innovation in Organizations
by
Trey Cummings
Doctor of Philosophy in Business Administration
Washington University in St. Louis, 2019
Anne Marie Knott, Chair
This dissertation weaves together three distinct chapters that are unified in their focus on the
microfoundations of innovation in organizations. Chapter 1 utilizes a unique NASA employee
data set to investigate the effect of promotion reward incentives on knowledge worker
innovation. This study is the first to empirically show a positive relationship of promotion
incentives with individual innovation outcomes in a field setting while also revealing a decrease
in collaboration. This result exposes promotion structure as a potentially powerful tool for
affecting innovation. Chapter 2 develops a unique measure of R&D structure and finds that the
incentives created by long-term institutional investors lead managers to create a more centralized
R&D structure. This study is the first to empirically link ownership orientation, managerial
incentives, and R&D structure. Lastly, Chapter 3 is an exploratory investigation of the
innovation direction that CEOs with heterogeneous experience take their organization. The
surprising results indicate that CEOs hired from outside the firm do not take the firm in a new
innovation direction but rather have a lack of direction. Taken in aggregate, the results show that
a focus on the microfoundations of innovation in organizations can provide novel and interesting
questions for researchers together with managerially relevant answers to those questions.
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Preface
Innovation research in management literature has primarily focused on the organizational
level yet a pillar of the knowledge-based view of the firm is that knowledge resides at the
individual level (Grant, 1996). The role of firms in this view is to efficiently organization to
generate new knowledge (Nickerson and Zenger, 2004). Management scholars have recently
called attention to the “microfoundations” of strategy (Coff and Kryscynski, 2011; Gavetti, 2005;
Lippman and Rumelt, 2003; Teece, 2007) which is primarily interested in how individual level
attributes interact with higher level organizational factors to affect performance (Barney and
Felin, 2013; Felin, Foss, and Ployhart, 2015). Although knowledge inherently resides in
individuals, organizational innovation outcomes are also dependent on the environment and
governance in which these individuals operate. Therefore, it is critical for managers and scholars
to understand the microfoundations of innovation governance to inform innovation strategy.
This dissertation draws upon and contributes to the microfoundations literature by
investigating multiple aspects of the microfoundations of innovation governance in three distinct
yet unified chapters. The unifying principle is the focus on how innovation governance at the
organizational level interacts with individual factors (e.g. motivation, incentives, etc.). The
diversity of exploration in this dissertation provides evidence of the value in the
microfoundations of innovation in organizations. Topics include the effect of potential
promotion rewards on knowledge worker innovation at NASA (Chapter 1), the effect of
ownership on managerial R&D structure decisions (Chapter 2), and the effect of CEO
background on the organization’s innovation direction (Chapter 3).
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The dissertation makes multiple unique contributions to the literature. In particular, Chapter
1 is the first to show the positive relationship of promotion incentives on innovation using
(NASA) field data. More broadly, it shows the potential for promotion structure – an
understudied concept in the innovation literature – to be a managerial tool to affect innovation
outcomes. Chapter 2 first develops an open source measure of R&D structure that will facilitate
future research. With that measure of R&D structure, the chapter contributes theoretically and
empirically by exploring the role of ownership orientation in R&D structure decisions. Chapter
3 is an exploratory analysis leading to a re-evaluation of the role of outside CEOs. Despite the
likelihood that outside CEOs are brought in to make changes, they make changes to innovation
comparatively less than their counterparts hired from inside. Each chapter makes a unique
contribution but all collectively focus on the microfoundations of innovation in organizations.
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17(S2): 109–122.
Lippman SA, Rumelt RP. 2003. The payments perspective: micro-foundations of resource
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perspective. Organization science 15(6): 617–632.
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Chapter 1: Rocketing to the Top: Promotion
Tournament Rewards and Innovation at NASA
1.1 Introduction
“We live and die on innovation. If they are innovating and coming up with solutions that lead to
better missions then I will put them at the front of the promotion line”. –NASA Engineering
Manager

Understanding knowledge workers’ motivations to innovate is important for any
organization’s innovation governance strategy (Cohen and Sauermann 2007). Research shows
that extrinsic rewards can motivate knowledge workers (Azoulay, Graff Zivin, and Manso 2011;
Ederer and Manso 2013; Manso 2011; Sauermann and Cohen 2010) yet debate about the effect
of such rewards on intrinsic motivation to create and innovate still exists (Amabile 1983; Collins
and Amabile 1999; Deci and Ryan 1985; Erat and Gneezy 2016). In light of this debate,
surprisingly little research has investigated the effect of extrinsic rewards on individual
innovation outcomes in organizations. This chapter explores the effect of one such reward,
promotion tournament rewards1, on individual innovation. Two general phenomenon make this
exploration important. First, promotion tournament rewards are among the most ubiquitous and
consequential rewards available to employees in modern organizations (Cowgill 2014). Second,
firms are in a period of flattening hierarchies (Rajan and Wulf 2006; Acemoglu et al. 2007;

1

Competition between workers for promotion within an organization resulting in an increase in salary,
responsibility, and prestige (Lazear and Rosen 1981; Moldovanu, Sela, and Shi 2007)
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Guadalupe and Wulf 2010) which not only alters the span of control but also indicates a dynamic
shift in individual promotion rewards.
This chapter utilizes original employee-level data from the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) to investigate the effect of promotion tournament rewards on
innovation. To my knowledge, the chapter is the first to empirically show a positive relationship
of promotion tournament rewards to knowledge worker innovation in a field setting. Qualitative
interviews with NASA scientists, engineers, and managers complement the empirical results by
exploring NASA’s innovation process and the chapter’s proposed mechanism. Overall, results
reveal that managers can potentially affect the prevalence and external dissemination of
innovation through changes in the organizational promotion structure.
A complication for innovation with promotion tournament rewards is that more is not
necessarily better. Individuals are likely to increase effort and risk taking to separate
performance from peers while decreasing peer collaboration in an effort to isolate their
contribution (Goel and Thakor 2008; Lazear and Rosen 1981; Lazear and Shaw 2007;
Prendergast 1999; Lazear 1989). Despite the prevalence of promotion tournaments and the
important theoretical innovation implications, few studies exist on promotion tournaments for
knowledge workers because of two main barriers. First, it is difficult for researchers to gain
access to detailed organizational information at the individual level. Second, many firms do not
track innovation at the individual level.
This chapter investigates the individual-level effects of promotion tournament rewards on
innovation, and overcomes data barriers by utilizing NASA employee data obtained through a
freedom of information act (FOIA) request and connecting individual innovation outcomes to
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publicly available data for publications and patents. The dataset covers the period from 20042016 and contains employee name, location, occupation, job level, and salary for 30,750 unique
employees and over 245K employee-year observations across 10 NASA locations. The
individual-level salary records allow for the construction of a standard measure of the promotion
tournament reward, which is defined as the difference between salaries across job levels (Becker
and Huselid 1992; Messersmith et al. 2011; Lazear 1991). The identifying information on
NASA employees allow us to measure innovation by matching these individuals to 12,482
publications as well as 992 patents over this time period.
NASA provides a setting that is appropriate – and even advantageous - for multiple reasons.
First, the federal government controls promotion rewards and NASA has little control over
establishing the promotion rewards structure. This separation of policy and management
alleviates the concern that NASA endogenously designs promotion tournaments based on
differences in innovation across groups. Second, only 1% of employees switch locations in a
given year, which reveals little endogenous sorting across tournaments and locations by NASA
employees. Third, NASA operates at 10 sites across the United States with simultaneous
promotion tournaments that have significant variation in the number of employees and rates of
innovation yet are very similar on other dimensions such as occupation type, job level, and
promotion criteria. This creates similar yet relatively autonomous promotion structures across
sites. Fourth, NASA is not a typical public sector organization in that it is internationally
recognized as one of the most innovative organizations in history (Dick 2012). Finally, NASA
employees are highly intrinsically motivated which provides a base case for the effect of
extrinsic promotion tournament rewards on knowledge worker innovation.

3

Empirical results testing the relationship of promotion tournament rewards to innovation and
teamwork reveal an increase in innovation as promotion rewards increase although there is also a
corresponding decrease in internal collaboration. Employee fixed effects models reveal two
additional significant results. First, promotion tournament rewards may lead to an increase in
external collaboration, which has implications for knowledge search. For instance, firms may be
able to encourage different types and levels of collaboration (e.g. collaboration outside the
organization) with different promotion rewards. Second, NASA employees likely exhibit
heterogeneity in their motivations with respect to extrinsic promotion tournament incentives,
consistent with prior knowledge worker literature (Sauermann and Cohen 2010). Finally, I
instrument promotion tournament reward utilizing local housing price. The instrumental variable
results are consistent with the basic results providing additional evidence to alleviate endogeneity
concerns.
This chapter makes multiple contributions to the innovation management literature with
respect to the characterization and outcomes of innovation with promotion reward structure
heterogeneity. To my knowledge, this research is the first to show the positive relationship of
promotion incentives to innovation outcomes despite a decrease in internal collaboration. More
broadly, this chapter connects to the knowledge-based view of the firm by showing how internal
organization of promotion structure and incentives can shape the way in which the firm generates
knowledge (Grant 1996; J. Nickerson and Zenger 2004). Prior literature has focused on span of
control (Rajan and Wulf 2006; Acemoglu et al. 2007; Guadalupe and Wulf 2010) or formal R&D
structure (Argyres and Silverman 2004; Arora, Belenzon, and Rios 2014) where this chapter
focuses on the individual incentives associated with structure decisions. The chapter also places
emphasis on the microfoundations of innovation in organizations (Felin, Foss, and Ployhart
4

2015; Barney and Felin 2013) by investigating ways in which individual innovators can be
governed and shows important implications of individual aggregation.
The chapter also reveals information that is managerially relevant. First and foremost,
managers can affect innovation by structuring promotion tournaments differently. The optimal
promotion tournament is likely to differ with the characteristics the organization’s problems and
knowledge set because the importance of collaboration differs across these dimensions. Second,
the results show the potential power of organizational scale because large organizations have
more options in how to structure promotions.

1.2 Background
This chapter draws heavily upon two literature streams to develop a framework of the
motivations and incentives of knowledge workers to innovate. Although these two streams have
largely progressed in a disparate manner, this chapter will point out the importance of their
connections in understanding the effect of promotion rewards on innovation. The first stream
investigates the heterogeneous motivations of knowledge workers. Research has shown that
many knowledge workers are intrinsically motivated by the “taste for science” (Roach and
Sauermann 2010; Sauermann and Roach 2014; Stern 2004) yet are also motivated by extrinsic
rewards such as salary (Sauermann and Cohen 2010; Manso 2011; Azoulay, Graff Zivin, and
Manso 2011; Ederer and Manso 2013). In particular, incentives that tolerate short-term failure
but reward long-term success may encourage innovation (Manso 2011; Azoulay, Graff Zivin,
and Manso 2011; Ederer and Manso 2013).
The second literature stream investigates what are termed “promotion tournaments”. Risk
taking, effort, and collaboration are all important for innovation and promotion tournament
rewards create a motivational tension between these three actions. Individuals are likely to
5

increase risk taking and effort to separate their performance from peers (Goel and Thakor 2008;
Lazear and Rosen 1981; Lazear and Shaw 2007; Prendergast 1999). They are also likely to
decrease collaboration with promotion competitors for the same reason (Lazear 1989). The link
between these two literature streams is in the structure of the rewards. Promotion tournament
rewards are likely to tolerate short-term failure, as there is a salary safety net. However, longterm success leads to significant promotion rewards.

1.2.1 Knowledge Worker Motivations
Research in the last 15 years has begun to unwrap the complex motivations of knowledge
workers. Stern (2004) utilized a survey of biology PhD students on the job market to pit two
competing views of knowledge workers’ contribution within a firm. The first view is that
scientists “prefer” the ability to pursue basic science and are willing to accept a lower salary to
do so. The second view is that employing knowledge workers engaged in scientific activity will
increase the firm’s ability to create or absorb valuable knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal 1990).
The author finds support for the preference effect where firms that offer scientific freedom also
offer lower salaries. Therefore, scientists may pay a salary price to pursue science. The
implication is that knowledge workers have an intrinsic “taste for science” that may motivate
them to forgo other types of incentives.
Follow-on research investigated heterogeneity in this taste for science. Utilizing a survey
of 1900 science and engineering PhD students, Sauermann and Roach (2014) found significant
heterogeneity in the price these students were willing to pay to pursue science. Those with a
strong “taste for science” preferred academic jobs while students motivated by salary preferred
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industry jobs (Roach and Sauermann 2010). Thus, the motivation is less intrinsic for industrial
scientists compared to those pursuing academic positions.
Given this heterogeneity in motivations, it is unclear if pecuniary and/or non-pecuniary
incentives will lead to increases in knowledge production and innovation. Sauermann and Cohen
(2010) look deeper at the correlation of knowledge worker motivations and innovation outcomes.
Utilizing a large survey of professional scientists and engineers, the authors find a strong positive
relationship between innovation outcomes and the desire for income, independence, and
intellectual challenge while also showing a negative relationship between innovation and the
desire for job security and responsibility. Thus, both pecuniary (income) and non-pecuniary
(independence and intellectual challenge) incentives are correlated with higher innovation
outcomes. These papers all utilize survey instruments to understand individual knowledge
worker motivations and relate them to job offers or self-reported innovation outcomes, which
allows us to understand the selection mechanism of knowledge workers into firms.
Lastly, it is theorized that innovation requires a different type of incentive structure (Manso
2011). In particular, innovation will increase with the combination of early failure acceptance
and incentives for long-term success (Azoulay, Graff Zivin, and Manso 2011; Ederer and Manso
2013; Manso 2011). Empirical research shows external research grants with longer life cycles
lead to higher publication output (Azoulay, Graff Zivin, and Manso 2011). The interpretation is
that a mixed pay for performance system might be optimal with guaranteed fixed pay combined
with a long-term incentive.
In summary, this stream of research indicates that knowledge workers may need to accept
lower wages to increase their scientific freedom in the workplace. However, they are
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heterogeneous in their taste for science and sort into academic and industrial jobs based on their
heterogeneous preferences. Given these preferences, both extrinsic and intrinsic motivations
correlate with higher innovation output. Therefore, the structure of any extrinsic rewards is
important in promoting rather than destroying innovation.

1.2.2 Extrinsic Incentives and Creativity
There are two opposing views within the creativity literature on the effect of extrinsic
incentives on creativity. The first view is that creativity is inherently an intrinsically motivated
activity and extrinsic incentives will take away from that motivation to decrease creativity
(Amabile 1983; Collins and Amabile 1999; Deci and Ryan 1985; Erat and Gneezy 2016). The
second view is that creativity is dependent on freedom, self-determination, and empowerment.
The belief is that rewards for creativity may signal more empowerment to the employee by
showing that the principal does not really have control over the process and the agent can decline
the reward if wanted. This proposed explanation is supported by empirical results that show a
positive relationship between extrinsic rewards and creativity (Eisenberger and Rhoades 2001;
Eisenberger and Shanock 2003).
The second view highlights that extrinsic rewards may increase intrinsic motivation when
the intrinsic motivation is self-determined because it re-enforces the importance of the
individual’s autonomy. With respect to innovation, the latter viewpoint may be more relevant.
For example, NASA employees are self-determined and rewards likely re-inforce the importance
of their self-determination. It is also worth noting that the incentives offered in these studies are
of much lower power and shorter in time horizon compared to career incentives for promotion.
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They also largely do not involve knowledge workers but rather general employees, students, or
even children.

1.2.3 Promotion Tournaments
An interesting result from the previously discussed research on knowledge worker
motivations is the correlation of extrinsic incentives to innovation outcomes (Azoulay, Graff
Zivin, and Manso 2011; Ederer and Manso 2013; Sauermann and Cohen 2010). The following
paragraphs provide an overview of one such extrinsic incentive, promotion tournament rewards,
which are present for over ¾ of all workers (Cowgill 2014) and have profound theoretical
implications for innovation. The theoretical concept of promotion tournaments (also called
employee tournaments, rank-order tournaments, etc.) was crystallized by Lazear and Rosen
(1981) and virtually all theoretical predictions descend from their constructs. Their theory holds
that monitoring the effort of employees is costly and promotion tournaments that reward based
on relative rank to peers have the potential to lower monitoring costs while incentivizing certain
employee behaviors (Lazear and Rosen 1981).
Promotion-based tournaments pool a portion of wages from all employees in a job rank
or level to the salaries of higher ranks and the promotion provides a clear winner of that salary
pool. Promotion tournament theory has subsequently developed a set of stylized behavioral
predictions. This potential for a discrete jump in compensation as well as increases in
responsibility and prestige elicits certain behavioral effects from employees. First, they act to
increase employee effort (Lazear and Rosen 1981; Lazear and Shaw 2007; Prendergast 1999)
through the ability to motivate and attract employees at lower levels in hopes of winning the
tournament prize (Lazear and Shaw 2007). Second, promotion tournaments may increase the
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risk taking of innovative employees in an effort to outshine their peers competing for the same
promotion (Goel and Thakor 2008).
Similar to the incentives that encourage individual risk taking, employees may engage in
other less optimal behaviors to separate themselves from peers. One way in which this could
occur is through a decrease in teamwork and cooperation (Lazear 1989) which may play out
through sabotage (Dye 1984) or influence activities (Milgrom and Roberts 1988). Employees
compete in tournaments alongside fellow employees with whom they need to work together for
overall organizational success. In an attempt to provide separation from others in the
tournament, employees may block competitor’ successes through decreased teamwork. This
potentially negative effect of promotion tournament rewards on cooperation may offset the
positives of effort and risk taking. Workers must make a determination of the benefit of
collaboration to the innovation’s outcome, the cost of coordinating, and the cost of sharing
rewards with the team (Deichmann and Jensen 2018). Teamwork effects may be especially
pertinent in innovative organizations where information exchange and cooperation are necessary
to innovate (Siegel and Hambrick 2005).
Matching the organization’s strategy to individual compensation incentives is non-trivial
yet important for performance (Tenhiälä and Laamanen 2018). Firms face a challenge in
designing promotion tournaments, based on their specific capabilities and objectives. If the
tournament prize is too small, there may be suboptimal effort and innovation risk taking;
however, if the tournament prize is too large, there may be suboptimal teamwork to combine
knowledge across individuals in order to innovate. These competing effects of promotion
tournaments pose an organizational design challenge for firms: how to design the organization’s
levels of hierarchy and span of control that optimizes the tension between individual effort and
10

collaboration. Interestingly, there has been little consideration of tournaments in organizational
design. This is because the focus has largely been on span of control rather than incentive
considerations (Rajan and Wulf 2006).
The promotion tournament literature has begun empirically testing theoretical predictions
but detailed employee level data has been a significant barrier. Firms are reluctant to provide
employee information which initially led to promotion tournament research in contexts such as
sporting events where the size of a tournament prize has been shown to increase effort (Becker
and Huselid 1992; Ehrenberg and Bognanno 1990). However, research investigating the variety
of effects from promotion tournaments is accumulating and there has recently been a growing
number of studies that use employee or firm level data to investigate the predictions of greater
effort as envisioned through performance outcomes (DeVaro 2006; Brown, Sturman, and
Simmering 2003; Shaw, Gupta, and Delery 2002; Pfeffer and Langton 1993), higher risk taking
and innovativeness (Kini and Williams 2012), and higher turnover (Shaw and Gupta 2007;
Bloom and Michel 2002; Kacperczyk and Balachandran 2018). Studies that utilize firm data
largely investigate public firm CEO tournaments where data is readily available.
In summary, theory predicts that promotion tournaments will increase effort and risk
taking while decreasing collaboration. Given that knowledge creation can rely on all three of
these attributes to varying degrees, it is important to understand the effect of promotion
tournaments on knowledge worker innovation because it has the potential to be an important tool
for firms in their innovation governance strategy. Thus, it is peculiar that promotion tournament
empirical research has done little investigation of innovation at the employee level. This is likely
due to difficulty in obtaining the promotion tournament structure for an organization as well as
difficulty in measuring innovation.
11

1.3 Research Setting
The setting for this study is the United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA), which is responsible for the civilian space program as well as aeronautics and
aerospace research. NASA’s primary value to society “is as an engine of innovation” (Pyle
2014, vii). NASA had 17,239 employees as of September 2016 dispersed across 10 nation-wide
sites. NASA categorizes sites as “Mission” or “Research” based on their primary objective and
purpose. Panel A in Figure 1.1 shows the geographic distribution, relative size, and category of
these sites across the United States.
---------------------------------------Insert Figure 1.1 about Here
---------------------------------------The public largely knows NASA by the organization’s major accomplishments such as
safely landing men on the moon with the Apollo space program, building a re-usable space
shuttle, and exploring the outer reaches of our solar system with the Hubble telescope. However,
many less-heralded innovations made these larger accomplishments possible and NASA also
innovates in many peripheral areas. For instance, NASA inventions include memory foam,
scratch resistant lenses, adjustable smoke detectors, and ear thermometers (Tushman, LifshitzAssaf, and Herman 2014). NASA must ensure that their knowledge workers innovate beyond
rocket science to fulfill the overall mission of their organization.
NASA also has a long history of collaboration with academia and private industry. Their
partnership with Cal Tech at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory exemplifies this collaborative spirit,
as do the long-standing relationships with contractors that build NASA products. More recently,
budget cuts have made this relationship even more important with NASA’s focus on accessing
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and disseminating knowledge through methods such as open innovation (Tushman, LifshitzAssaf, and Herman 2014). NASA innovation has been the focus of multiple prior studies. Most
recently, research has focused on the benefits of open innovation at NASA by showing the power
of utilizing crowdsourcing platforms to solve complex coding problems such as modeling
encounters with unexpected solar flares in space (Boudreau and Lakhani 2016, 2011; Lakhani,
Lifshitz-Assaf, and Tushman 2013).
The setting is highly conducive for studying the effect of promotion tournament rewards
for multiple reasons. First, it is imperative for NASA to attract and retain employees of the
highest quality and they must compete with private organizations for that human capital.
Second, innovation is key for the success of the organization. NASA has solved innovation
problems throughout its history that no private sector firms would have the market incentives to
solve. Third, NASA is an organization where employees are likely intrinsically motivated with
many dreaming of working at the agency from a young age. Thus, the effect of tournament
incentives at NASA is likely a low estimate in comparison to firms in the private sector with less
intrinsically motivated employees2.

1.3.1 NASA Employee Interviews
The author administered qualitative interviews with NASA employees to explore the
chapter’s underlying assumptions about NASA’s innovation process, promotion process, and
innovation incentives. One goal of these informal interviews was to get the perspective of a
broad spectrum of employees including engineers, scientists, front-line managers, and senior
managers. The chapter’s premise that the promotion reward affects the innovation and teamwork

2

External validity is reviewed in the discussion section.
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of NASA employees relies on multiple assumptions about the employee’s knowledge as well as
NASA’s innovation and promotion process. First, employees must be generally aware of the
promotion reward. Second, employees must believe that innovation will positively affect their
probability of promotion. Third, employees must have some autonomy in choosing projects and
collaborators. The interviews explored these assumptions with a broad set of questions tailored
to each occupation type.
Interviews indicated that employees were generally aware of the promotion reward
available to them and the role that innovation played in the promotion decision. For instance,
one scientist noted, “If I am a GS14 and my boss is a GS15, I know the ballpark their salary is
in.” This was consistent across occupations and levels given that federal employee salaries are
public information and easily accessible as many websites contain this information.
Employee perceptions and actual practices associated with the role of innovation in the
promotion process were less obvious ex ante. Interviews indicated that innovation performance
is part of the formal employee review process at year’s end. A scientist noted, “Innovative
performance with patents and publications is one of the questions that are asked during the
annual reviews” and that “the annual review rating highly impacts your promotion probability”.
Individual contributors and managers echoed this important connection between innovation and
promotion. For instance, a technical manager noted that “if you can demonstrate creativity and
innovation, that gives you an edge over others for promotion”. Another manager bluntly stated,
“We live and die on innovation. If they are innovating and coming up with solutions that lead to
better missions then I will put them at the front of the promotion line”. More generally, one
engineer noted, “[innovation] is important for salary and promotion”. In fact, every interviewee
stated that innovation does and should play a significant part in promotion.
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Interviewees provided detail on the actual promotion and hiring process at NASA.
Promotions occurs through two separate processes. First is promoting without the need to apply.
For instance, an employee can be promoted to the next level without the need for him or her to
formally submit for the job. Employees indicated that this is the least prevalent method of
promotion and rarely occurs at middle and senior levels. The most prevalent method for
promotion is a competitive posting on USAJobs.gov. The process involves applying online to a
job where any potential applicant (internally or externally) can apply. Promotion (or hiring) is
evaluated through a combination of general aptitude and specific education, training, and
experience related to the needs of the job. Managers indicated that NASA experience in the
posted occupation provides applicants a significant advantage and most internal hires come from
within the occupation and location of the job posting.
Employees indicated that endogenous team formation is very common although not the
only way in which innovative NASA teams form. In some instances, management forms the
teams to solve a problem. However, a technical fellow indicated, “teams are formed more so
naturally than directed by management”. Another technical manager stated, “I have seen more
failure with directed innovation than organic innovation”. This theme of employee autonomy in
forming teams was consistent across occupations and levels.
In summary, these informal interviews served to corroborate assumptions that underlie
the proposed mechanism in this chapter. First, employees are aware of the promotion reward
available to them. Thus, the reward has the potential to affect employee behavior. Second,
individual contributors believe that innovation positively influences their promotion chance
while managers indicated they promote and hire based on innovative performance. Therefore,
employees may want to increase innovative output to increase their chance of promotion. Third,
15

employees have autonomy in forming teams. Thus, individual incentives may affect an
employee’s desire to team with others. Lastly, I asked an additional question about what
managers can do to motivate employees to innovate. One employee lamented, “bonuses are very
tiny” while a manager noted, “there’s not a whole lot of carrots I can offer”. One carrot that
NASA managers can offer is promotion.

1.4 Data and Measures
Federal employees’ non-executive job levels are classified by a system called “general
schedule” (GS) which spans from 01 to 15. Each GS category has an associated median salary
set by the federal government, which is adjusted depending on the location of the job. Senior
positions with more responsibility, including management of other employees, are on the top end
of the scale while entry level and non-skilled positions are toward the lower end. Most job
positions within NASA where employees generate significant innovation are associated with
grades (NASA’s term for job level) 11 through 15. Multiple occupation types (e.g. various types
of engineers, scientists, etc.) generate a variety of innovations (e.g. patents, publications,
standards, mission enhancements, etc.) and each job type has its own GS grades within it.
Interviews revealed that NASA employees generally compete for promotion with peers in their
same job and grade. Thus, there are many employee tournaments for promotion occurring
simultaneously within and across sites.
Although the interviews provide initial indications that innovation positively affects
promotion, additional evidence that promotions are merit-based is found in an internal federal
employee satisfaction survey taken in 2017. Survey statistics shown in Appendix Figure B1.5
reveal the agency-level mean results from two relevant questions for the 43 federal agencies
surveyed. NASA employees rated themselves the highest of all agencies on how they are
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rewarded for innovation and creativity and ranked third in promotions based on merit. These
two survey statistics lend credence to the underlying assumption that promotion is positively
related to innovation, corroborating the qualitative evidence. NASA employees believe that they
will be rewarded for innovation and that promotions are merit-based compared to other federal
agencies.
Although NASA innovates in many ways, this chapter will focus on two consistent and
measurable innovation outputs across organizations and locations: publications and patents.
Both offer advantages in the empirical analysis. Patents are relatively rare, even at NASA, and
provide a measure of innovation that is both valuable and common across many literature
streams. However, NASA employees innovate through peer-reviewed publications much more
frequently and across a wider variety of occupations. Thus, peer-reviewed publications are a
second and more common way in which to measure NASA employee innovation.
Data for empirically investigating the effect of promotion rewards on innovation comes
from aggregating across four sources. First, the author filed a freedom of information act
(FOIA) request with NASA headquarters in June 2017 and received identifying information in
March 2018 on all NASA employees including name, job level (grade), salary, location, and
occupation from 2004 through 2016. This FOIA data is utilized to construct the employee
tournament measures, which are discussed in subsequent paragraphs. Second, raw data files
were directly collected from the federal Office of Personnel Management website containing
employee level data without names but with additional personally identifiable information (PII)
not included in the first data source such as education, age range, and NASA tenure (level of
service). These secondary employee attribute variables are constructed at an aggregate level for
use as controls.
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The third data source is the Web of Science (WoS) academic journal database, which was
queried for authors affiliated with NASA. Names in the WoS may not directly match the
employee name from the NASA FOIA data so the WoS and employee data are linked by author
name utilizing fuzzy matching on multiple variations of an employee’s name. Five variations of
the name in the employee data were constructed based on common ways in which the WoS
authors are named in papers. For instance, the fictitious employee name of Sarah Jeanne
Johnson is matched to the WoS data utilizing her full name as well as Sarah Johnson, S Johnson,
S J Johnson, and Sarah J Johnson contingent on that version of the name uniquely identifying her
within NASA. This strict matching criterion ensures that there are no false positive matches
between an employee and innovation outcomes at the expense of false negatives. For instance, if
there is a NASA publication author identified as S Johnson and employees named Sarah Johnson
and Steve Johnson, there will be no employee matched to this publication.
The fourth and last data source is the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) database, which was queried by assignee for all NASA name variations. All authors
on any patents containing NASA as the assignee were matched to the NASA FOIA employee
data with the same methodology as the publication data. These two innovation data sources were
used to construct the main dependent variables (the number of publications or patents) linked to
individual NASA employees within a given year.
The raw FOIA data itself reveals interesting information about NASA. The workforce is
highly educated and skewed toward older employees (see Figure B1.1). Panel B of Figure 1.1
also integrates innovation data and shows the differences in both size and innovation output at
each of the 10 NASA sites. It reveals significant innovation heterogeneity across NASA sites in
both patents and publications. Langley, the largest site, has the highest output of patents per
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employee while Ames, the smallest site, has the highest output of publications per employee.
Heterogeneity also exists across occupations for innovative output and collaboration (see Figure
B1.4).
Overall, the data reveals a highly educated and experienced workforce that produces
significant innovation. Important variation in innovation outcomes exist across locations,
occupations, and groups, which lends itself to the potential for understanding why we see these
differential outcomes. The analysis will investigate the effect of differences and similarities
across locations, occupations, and individuals in the effect of promotion tournament rewards on
innovation.

1.4.1 Independent Variables
Promotion pools are defined as the set of employees at the same location, in the same
occupation, and at the same job level. These are the most likely competitors for promotion as
switching occupation or geography is infrequently observed in the data. Figure 1.2 drills down
to show a hypothetical example of an individual promotion tournament between level 12
aerospace engineers at Langley Research Center that are competing for a promotion to level 13.
The chapter refers to this as a “tournament” throughout.
---------------------------------------Insert Figure 1.2 about Here
---------------------------------------One potential concern is that employees at NASA may not actually be in a promotion
tournament at all. In fact, it is commonly believed that promotion in a government job is all
about tenure in the job and age of the employee. However, multiple aspects of the quantitative
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and qualitative evidence point to NASA having limited promotions for which employees
compete. First, the federal government controls the NASA budget. Thus, NASA cannot create
an unlimited amount of funding for promotions. Second, qualitative interviews indicate that
employees do compete for promotion among peer groups. Third, the data itself provides
circumstantial evidence for promotion competitions. Figure 1.3 provides the distribution of age
(Panel A) and NASA tenure (Panel B) within each job level. The bar within the shaded region of
Panel A is the median age within the job level (grades 11 through 15) while the top and bottom
line of the shaded region represents the 75th and 25th percentile values, respectively. Panel A
reveals that age is certainly not the only determining factor in climbing the promotion ladder. In
fact, the median age for levels 12, 13, and 14 are almost identical. In addition, there is very
significant overlap in the distribution of age across each level. Panel B provides similar
information for NASA tenure. This raw data provides clear evidence that tenure and age alone
do not explain NASA promotions.
---------------------------------------Insert Figure 1.3 about Here
---------------------------------------Finally, Figure 1.4 shows NASA promotion rates by job level over time. If unlimited
promotions were available (not a competition/tournament), the expectation is that there would be
significant fluctuation in this rate over time. In other words, a stable number of promotions is
indicative of a tournament rather than unlimited employee promotions. Figure 1.4 reveals
promotion rates remain relatively stable over time, which is interpreted as an indication that an
unlimited number of promotions are not available and that competition for scarce promotions is
likely. When paired with the qualitative evidence mentioned above, there is clear circumstantial
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evidence that NASA employees do compete with each other for promotion, rather than having a
promotion created when they pass a certain threshold.
---------------------------------------Insert Figure 1.4 about Here
----------------------------------------

1.4.2 Variables
The main analysis utilizes the promotion tournament reward as the independent variable
which is the difference between the mean salary of the employee’s current job level and the next
higher job level within the same location and occupation. For example, the promotion
tournament reward for a level 12 aerospace engineer at Langley Research Center is the mean
salary of all level 13 aerospace engineers at Langley minus the mean salary of all level 12
aerospace engineers at Langley. Horizontal tournament size is the number of employees in any
given tournament. For the same example, it is the number of level 12 aerospace engineers at
Langley. This measure is largely utilized as a control variable. Although the FOIA data does
contain executive positions, it does not specify the executive level, which prohibits the ability to
construct executive promotion tournaments. Therefore, the analysis will focus on non-executive
positions, which comprise the vast majority of observations. Moreover, executive tournaments
are more prevalent in the literature since this data is readily available for public companies.
The dependent variable for examining innovation is a count variable indicating the
number of publications or patents for an employee in a given year. This is constructed from the
matched WoS/USPTO and employee data. The dependent variable for examining collaboration
is the count of NASA publication co-authors on a paper. A decrease in this number indicates a
decrease in internal collaboration.
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Control variables are constructed at both the individual and group levels depending on
the availability of the data. Controls for location, occupation type, and job level are utilized from
the FOIA data linked to employee names. Group level controls are aggregated from the publicly
available anonymous employee level data including controls for mean level of service, age,
education, and supervisorial presence that are generated at the year-location-occupation-grade
level. These controls help to parse out the effect of the employee tournament from the effect of
differences in the attributes of employees across groups. Horizontal tournament size is also
utilized to control for the potential that promotion tournament rewards may correlate with
differences in the number of peers, which could subsequently affect innovation.
Summary statistics for the data are shown in Table 1.1: Panel A is at the employee-year
observation level, Panel B at the group-year observation level, and Panel C at the innovation
observation level. The 236,363 observations in Panel A represents 30,750 unique employees
over the 13-year period from 2004 to 2016. Table 1.1 reveals that there is significant variation in
the promotion tournament reward. With respect to innovation, employee-year observations have
a mean publication frequency of 0.08 in any given year and they frequently work with external
authors (the mean proportion of authors that are associated with NASA employees is ~48%). On
the patent side, employee-year observations have a mean of 0.01 patents, which underscores both
the innovativeness of NASA employees and the relative frequency of publications to patents
(~8X).
---------------------------------------Insert Table 1.1 about Here
----------------------------------------
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1.5 Analysis and Results
The chapter’s first preliminary empirical analysis is a verification of the underlying assumption
of innovation’s importance to promotion3. More explicitly, if a positive relationship between
successful innovation and promotion does not exist, the proposed mechanism is in doubt. Table
1.2 investigates this relationship for publications in Panel A with basic controls for job level and
year while Panel B mirrors this analysis for patents. Job level dummy variables are necessary
because successful innovations are more likely to occur at high job levels while promotions are
less likely to occur. Columns 1 through 3 show the relationship between a publication and
promotion in each of the subsequent three years with errors clustered at the site-occupation level.
NASA interviews revealed autonomy in the promotion process across location (site) and
occupation. For instance, human resource representatives generally represent an occupation type
rather than an entire site and the actual hiring/promotion manager has control over the attributes
desired for promotion. Thus, it can be reasonably assumed that correlation of errors will occur
within the same location and job. Standard errors with alternative clustering are shown in
Appendix A14. Columns 4 through 6 add employee fixed effects. The analysis utilizes a logit
specification because of the binary nature of the dependent variable, promotion, which is equal to
one in a year when the employee moves up a job grade (receives a promotion).
---------------------------------------Insert Table 1.2 about Here
----------------------------------------

3

The assumption is also supported by employee interviews indicating the importance of innovation in the promotion
process
4
An alternative assumption could be that site level human resource policies affecting promotion will lead to error
correlation at the site level. Panels A and B in Table A1.2 in Appendix A mirror Table 1.2 but cluster errors at the
site level rather than site-occupation level. These clustering differences do not affect the statistical significance of
the results.
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Columns 1 through 3 in Panel A reveal a robust positive relationship between the presence of a
publication in the base year and a lagged promotion in any of the next three years. Columns 4
through 6 show the robustness of that relationship when controlling for invariant individual
characteristics with the largest magnitude occurring in the year after a publication. The
employee fixed effects isolate the effect of successful innovation (rather than ability) on
promotion. Thus, the only reason for the strong relationship in Columns 1 through 3 is not that
more innovative or intelligent employees are more likely to both publish and be promoted. Panel
B repeats this analysis for patents to show that the impact of patents on promotion is very
significant in the subsequent year and less so in future years. This is likely because the higher
likelihood of promotion in year t+1 makes it much less likely to see a promotion in future years.
The interpretation of the employee fixed effects coefficients in the subsequent year (t+1) shows a
15.4% and 22.1% increase in promotions when the employee has a publication or patent,
respectively. Table A1.1 reveals similar results when the dependent variable is any innovation
(publication or patent). These results show that the presence of an innovation corresponds to a
significantly higher likelihood of promotion, which is circumstantial evidence for the promotion
tournament’s anticipated mechanism.
There are two key aspects of the data that must be taken into account when generating a
model specification. First, the dependent variable (number of publications or patents) is a count
variable. Second, an administrative employee with zero publications has the potential to be
fundamentally different from a physical scientist with zero publications. Therefore, it is likely
that the data has an excess of zeros from employees that are not trying to produce publications
and patents. The combination of these two factors makes a zero inflated negative binomial
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(ZINB) model an appropriate specification (Greene 2012)5. The ZINB first weights the
probability that each employee attempts to innovate by utilizing a logit model based on
covariates, which most importantly includes occupation but also age, tenure, etc. Next, a
negative binomial is utilized to model the count dependent variable based on both the weighting
that the employee attempts any innovation as well as the independent variable and controls.
I will first discuss the sources of variation to exploit in the data prior to discussing
specific results. First, there is variation in the promotion reward across occupations. For
instance, physicists and aerospace engineers have heterogeneous tournament rewards yet
innovation increases the probability of promotion in either occupation. Therefore, we can
exploit and understand the differences across occupations. We can also control for any invariant
differences in occupations using occupation fixed effects. Second, NASA has ten locations that
produce innovation as shown in Figure 1.1. Therefore, we can exploit that there are similar
tournaments occurring at multiple locations, which have differences in the promotion reward.
We can also control for any invariant differences (e.g. mission versus research site) with location
fixed effects. Lastly, there are group differences across time. One reason for the differences is
that there are ten salary levels within each NASA job level and hiring managers have discretion
in the promotion tournament by promoting employees beyond the most basic of these ten salary
levels. Therefore, we can exploit this variation even when utilizing both occupation and location
fixed effects. Although there is only minor flexibility, this managerial discretion leads to
potential endogeneity which the chapter will address using an instrumental variable in the
robustness section.

5

A classic example is to estimate the fish caught by visitors to national parks. Not all visitors fish so the covariates
(age, length of stay, type of stay, etc.) are utilized to estimate the probability of fishing. Next, the negative binomial
model is utilized to estimate the number of fish caught.
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We will first look at the relationship between promotion tournament rewards and
publication count for a given employee-year observation. A ZINB model is utilized to generate
the results reported in Columns 1 through 6 of Table 1.3. All errors are clustered at the siteoccupation level6 and all specifications have dummy variables for year and job grade (job level).
---------------------------------------Insert Table 1.3 about Here
---------------------------------------Columns 1 through 5 vary the type of dummy variables while column 6 integrates the full set of
group control variables. A consistent positive and statistically significant relationship of
promotion tournament rewards to publications is observed across all specifications. Column 1
tests the basic relationship of promotion tournament reward (in thousands of dollars) to the count
of publications while utilizing dummy variables for grade and year. The interpretation of the
coefficient on promotion tournament reward is that an increase in $1K in tournament size
correlates with an increase in the log of publication count by 0.1411. This translates to a $1K
increase in tournament size correlating to a 15.2% increase in publications for employees in each
tournament revealing a strong basic relationship between promotion tournament reward and
publications. One concern is that differences across sites account for a large part of the variation
and the results in column 1 are driven by these differences. An example is differences across
sites in how they manage innovation. Location dummy variables are added in Column 2 to
control for invariant differences across NASA sites, which reduces the coefficient by 22%. This
is interpreted to show that the relationship between tournament size and publications is still
6

The assumption of clustering at the site-occupation level is based on employee statements that promotion decisions
are reasonably independent outside of location and occupation. An alternative and more conservative assumption
would be that site policies will lead to correlation among errors. Thus, errors should be clustered at the site level.
These alternative results are shown in Table A1.5 in Appendix A. The alternative specifications do not affect the
statistical significance of the results.
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robust when controlling for unobserved and invariant differences in NASA sites. Horizontal
tournament size is added as a control to the basic regression in Column 3, which reveals a
continued positive relationship between promotion tournament reward and publications but a
negative relationship with horizontal tournament size. Column 4 removes the location dummy
variables and adds occupation dummy variables to aid in understanding the effect of controlling
for variation across occupations versus locations. The addition of occupation controls reveals
that a significant part of the magnitude in Model 1 is driven by invariant differences across
occupations. However, the relationship is still positive and statistically significant after
controlling for these differences. Column 5 integrates both location and occupation dummy
variables to allow variation to occur within the tournament. Finally, the group controls are added
in Column 6 to control for group attributes such as tenure and education. The results are not just
statistically but economically significant with one standard deviation increase in tournament size
($5.9K) being associated with a 16.6% increase in publications. Table A1.4 repeats the
regressions in Table 1.3 with an OLS, Poisson, and negative binomial specification and results
are consistent with the ZINB specification in Table 1.3. Overall, the results in Table 1.3 show
statistically strong correlational support for the positive effect of promotion tournament rewards
on publications.
Table 1.4 repeats a similar analysis but utilizes patents as the dependent variable rather
than publications. Errors are clustered at the site-occupation level7 for all specifications.
---------------------------------------Insert Table 1.4 about Here
---------------------------------------7

Table A1.7 in Appendix A show the results in Table 1.4 with errors clustered at the site level. Results remain
statistically significant.
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Similar to the results with publications in Table 1.4, all models show a positive and statistically
significant relationship between promotion tournament reward and patents. Controlling for
invariant differences across occupations provides a less dramatic impact for patents compared
with publications. The relationship is also economically significant as the estimate in Column 6
correlates to a 27.2% increase in patenting for a one standard deviation increase in promotion
tournament reward ($5.9K). The results in Table 1.4 again show strong correlational support for
the positive effect of promotion incentives on innovation.
We next investigate the relationship between tournament size and collaboration for a
given employee-year-publication observation because the DV is only available when an
innovation is present. There is no zero inflation occurring in this subsample so a negative
binomial model is utilized to generate the results reported in Table 1.5 and all errors are clustered
at the site-occupation level8.
---------------------------------------Insert Table 1.5 about Here
---------------------------------------Column 1 tests the basic relationship of promotion tournament reward to NASA publication coauthors while Column 2 adds the horizontal tournament control. Column 3 includes occupation
dummy variables while Column 4 integrates the group controls. All results show a negative and
statistically significant relationship between promotion tournament reward and internal NASA
collaboration. Similar to the results in Table 1.3, controlling for invariant differences across
occupations has a large effect on the magnitude yet all results are robust and statistically
significant. It is also economically significant as the coefficient in Column 4 reveals that a one
8

Table A1.10 in Appendix A show the results in Table 1.5 but with errors clustered at the site level. Results for
publication collaboration remain statistically significant.
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standard deviation increase in tournament size ($5.9K) is correlated with a 7.1% decrease in
internal NASA collaboration. Potential implications of the search for additional co-authors
outside the organization is analyzed with employee fixed effects in the robustness section and
discussed in the implications section.
Given the evidence that an increase in promotion tournament reward is associated with an
increase in publications (Table 1.3) and a decrease in internal co-authors (Table 1.5), a pertinent
question is how do promotion rewards affect the characteristics of the publication? I use three
different aspects of the publication to investigate this question in Table 1.6. I first investigate the
quality of the journal based on the journal impact score in Column 1. Next, I investigate the
uniqueness of the journal in Column 2 based on how frequently NASA employees publish in that
journal. Journal uniqueness alone may be an ambiguous measure of quality because it may be
that journals are unique because they are hard to publish in or they could be unique because they
are obscure and easy to get through peer review. A smaller coefficient represents less frequent /
more unique journal publications. Finally, I look at paper citations in Column 3.
---------------------------------------Insert Table 1.6 about Here
---------------------------------------Results show a positive but not statistically significant relationship with journal impact
factor yet a negative and statistically significant relationship with journal frequency. Given both
together, the results reveal NASA employees publish in more unique journals while not
decreasing the average journal quality. Finally, there is no statistically significant result on
citations. Thus, promotion rewards may lead to more unique innovation without sacrificing
average quality or impact.
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1.6 Robustness
A key alternative hypothesis for an increase in innovation with compensation incentives
is that employees are more willing to draw upon the human capital resources in the group
through co-authorships or that increasing the number of NASA collaborators artificially
increases innovation. Importantly, the combined publication results from Tables 1.3 and 1.5
alleviate this alternative hypothesis. In fact, the results reveal that publications increase in lieu of
a decrease in collaboration with NASA employees. Potential innovation implications of this
result are discussed in the implications section.
The panel data with 13 years of data and over 30K employees provides the opportunity to
use employee fixed effects for additional robustness. In particular, employee fixed effects can
help us understand how much of the magnitude is from differences across employees versus
within-employee changes in promotion reward. Table 1.7 utilizes a negative binomial
specification with the publications data using employee fixed effects. Columns 1 through 3
utilize publications as the DV (similar to Table 1.3) while Column 4 utilizes NASA co-authors as
the DV (similar to Table 1.5) and Column 5 utilizes external co-authors as the DV. Finally, the
WoS co-author data is parsed into general category. If the affiliation had any form of the word
“university” or “college”, it was identified as an academic co-author while all other co-authors
were lumped into the “other” category. This is because it is much more difficult to create an
algorithm to determine if a co-author is from industry versus the public sector. Thus, Column 6
uses external academic co-authors and Column 7 uses all non-academic co-authors as the DV.
---------------------------------------Insert Table 1.7 about Here
---------------------------------------30

Columns 1 through 3 provide qualitatively similar results to the basic results in Table 1.3.
Columns 1 tests the basic relationship of promotion tournament reward with grade and year
dummy variables and employee fixed effects. Column 2 adds horizontal tournament size as a
control while Column 3 adds the full set of controls. Each model shows a positive and
statistically significant relationship between promotion tournament reward and publications.
Columns 4 reveals a negative and statistically significant relationship between tournament
reward and NASA co-authors similar to the results in Table 1.5. Meanwhile, Column 5 reveals a
positive and statistically significant relationship between promotion tournament reward and
external co-authors. Given the result of a positive relationship between promotion rewards and
external co-authors, Columns 6 and 7 further investigate the type of outside co-author. Column
6 shows that the increase is not coming from more academic co-authors while Column 7
indicates the increase is coming from the “other” category made up of both industry and other
public organizations.
Two interesting results come from the analysis in Table 1.7. First, the coefficients for
promotion tournament reward in Column 3 represent approximately 2/3 the magnitude of the
corresponding coefficients in Table 1.3. This indicates that both within and across employee
variation in tournament size can explain a significant amount of the relationship. Second,
Columns 5 through 7 reveal that employees may co-author more externally and with nonacademic co-authors in the presence of larger promotion rewards. Implications of this potential
relationship are discussed in the following section.
Finally, I instrument promotion tournament reward with local housing price to further
mitigate endogeneity concerns. Yearly location-based job-level salary adjustments for federal
employees are generated through a formula taking into account cost of living as well as wages of
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similar occupations in each region. NASA has 10 different sites, which vary in their location
adjustment based on this calculation. Figure 1.5 shows how the federal cost of living adjustment
differs across NASA sites in 2018 (where shading is indicative of higher cost of living
adjustment). A key component of the adjustment difference across locations is housing price in
each individual location. This provides significant variation in salary adjustments and the gap
between job levels - promotion tournament reward.
---------------------------------------Insert Figure 1.5 about Here
---------------------------------------There are multiple potential arguments that housing prices violate the exclusion
restriction that need to be addressed. First, the methodology for adjusting salaries based on local
housing prices (and other goods) is not a NASA policy but rather a federal government policy.
Thus, NASA cannot alter the policy nor local housing prices to select which tournament rewards
will receive relative increases from year to year. A second and more realistic alternative
explanation is that areas with higher housing prices attract more innovative employees (e.g.
Silicon Valley). However, the argument made in this chapter is that relative year-to-year
changes in housing prices will lead to differences in promotion tournament rewards across sites.
If the alternative explanation around selection is true, we would expect to see a large number of
employees transferring to other sites. However, the raw data reveals exactly the opposite.
NASA employees switch sites in only ~1% of observations which lends credence to the potential
that more innovative employees are not selecting into locations that happen to have higher
housing prices. A third explanation is that housing wealth shocks could directly affect the
innovativeness of employees (Bernstein, Townsend, and McQuade 2017). Although the data
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does cover the Great Recession period, the vast majority of the employees in the sample are
unlikely to experience extreme shocks in wealth.
I use housing price to instrument promotion tournament reward based on the argument
that housing prices will not directly or indirectly affect innovation through any means other than
promotion tournament rewards. Therefore, I expect to see an increase in innovation at sites that
have larger tournaments due to a relatively high increase in housing price from year to year.
Housing price is constructed using two data sets. First, the federal government releases
the yearly housing price index for major cities across the US9. However, each city’s index has a
baseline of one for the year 1995, which allows us to look only at within city change over time.
This generates the need to establish a relative magnitude difference across cities with a second
database. A dataset provided by Zillow.com10 is utilized to establish average selling price in
2017 for the closest city to each of the NASA sites. This 2017 housing price for each site is
adjusted with the federal index to generate an estimated housing price in each year of the data
sample. Table 1.8 provides the results utilizing housing price as an instrument for promotion
tournament rewards. For ease of convergence, the chapter utilizes an OLS instrumental variable
specification. All standard errors are clustered at the site-occupation level.
---------------------------------------Insert Table 1.8 about Here
---------------------------------------Results corroborate the basic results from Table 1.3 (Column 6) with a slightly larger yet
statistically indistinguishable magnitude. The results of the IV analysis give additional

9

https://www.fhfa.gov/DataTools/Downloads/pages/house-price-index.aspx
https://www.zillow.com/research/data/

10
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confidence that tournament size is causing the increased innovation that we see in the basic
results. The results also provide additional evidence against the alternative selection hypothesis
with respect to housing prices. An expectation with this view is that housing prices are
associated with higher innovation due to the increase in innovative human capital brought to the
area. However, controlling for the group’s traits does not materially alter the results.

1.7 Discussion
Motivation, risk taking, and collaboration each contribute to the innovation process and
the incentives associated with promotion tournaments create interesting behaviors as revealed in
the chapter’s results. Results show that while motivation and/or risk taking may increase
innovation due to the promotion incentives, collaboration within the organization decreases.
Therefore, promotion incentives create tradeoffs for managers in designing such systems to
increase and manage the creation of new knowledge. This has real implications for managers
due to the heterogeneity of size, knowledge, employees, and organizational mission.
The first implication is the potential benefit of organizational scale. Results indicate that
managers may be able to affect innovation through changes in promotion tournaments and larger
organizations give managers more control over the number and size of promotion tournaments.
Prior research has shown that organizational size may increase comparison costs (largely with
respect to compensation) across employees which detracts from performance (Larkin, Pierce,
and Gino 2012; J. A. Nickerson and Zenger 2008). This chapter offers a compensation-based
advantage for larger firms in generating greater performance, at least with respect to innovation.
This advantage may be a factor (among many others) to help explain why larger firms are more
productive with their R&D spending (Knott 2017).
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The ability of management to structure promotion rewards creates strategic implications
for firms similar to other structure decisions such as R&D structure (Argyres and Silverman
2004; Arora, Belenzon, and Rios 2014). For instance, an organization similar to NASA can
decide to condense the primary knowledge worker job levels (11 through 15) from five to four
without changing the average pay of individuals in the organization. More specifically, the pay
dispersion from lowest to highest level would remain the same (~$62K) but would occur over
three promotion levels (~$20.6K per promotion) rather than four ($~15.5K per promotion).
According to the chapter’s results, this decision could have a material impact on innovation.
Back of the envelope calculations (using Table 1.3, Column 6 results) reveal that NASA could
generate an additional publication for every 37 employees, which would represent a significant
increase of over 400 publications for the ~17K employees. While this calculation simplifies a
very complex decision, it is meant to show a stylized example of the ease in which managers can
alter the promotion tournament reward and the potential effect on innovation.
The potential that promotion tournaments increase external coauthors may provide
differential benefits to firms. Heterogeneity in organizational mission and employee motivation
are likely to affect this result of employee tournaments. NASA is an organization whose mission
is inherently welfare enhancing and externally collaborative creation and dissemination of
knowledge is more likely to align with their organizational goals in comparison to privately held
firms. Private firms may generate value through protection of knowledge with internal
collaboration in contrast to external collaboration. Employee sorting is also likely to affect the
efficacy of employee tournaments. The results of this study reveal that time invariant individual
level attributes may account for a portion of the effect yet there are still significant differences
across employees. These differences may be driven by the presence of intrinsic versus extrinsic
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motivation. The effect of employee tournaments is likely to be less effective for employees with
intrinsic motivation such as in the public sector. Thus, the positive and negative effect of
employee promotion rewards is likely to increase in magnitude with private sector firms, which
also coincides with higher flexibility in designing such tournaments.
An issue with utilizing a public sector organization is the potential for external validity
concerns. One view is that public sector workers may be more intrinsically motivated based on
internal rewards rather than through external rewards which may lead to pro-social behaviors
such as accepting lower wages (Francois 2000). Intrinsic motivation also leads to less effective
extrinsic reward systems such as compensation incentives. In fact, extrinsic rewards may not
just be ineffective but may have the potential to crowd out intrinsic motivation (Benabou and
Tirole 2003; Gubler, Larkin, and Pierce 2016; Huffman and Bognanno 2017). However,
research in extrinsic rewards among public sector employees has also found positive
performance effects. Empirically, pay for performance effectiveness is shown to be dependent
on the organizational setting (Perry 1986) and specific studies have detected a positive effect
with teachers, civil servants, and health care workers (Prentice, Burgess, and Propper 2007).
Extant research has also shown that there are similarities between public sector
organizations and private sector firms and employees. First, the effectiveness of public sector
organizations are built upon the resources and capabilities of that organization which may
contribute to performance in complex ways (Garicano and Heaton 2010). Second, similar to
private sector firms, public sector firms must attract and retain human resources with the
capabilities to perform the required tasks.
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It is also possible the increase in innovation exhibited by NASA employees is the result
of gaming the system by directing their effort and resources to tasks that will increase rewards
while shirking on other important tasks for which they are not as heavily rewarded. Employees
have been shown to be proficient in learning how to maximize their incentive pay, which can
result in suboptimal outcomes for the organization (Frank and Obloj 2014; Obloj and Sengul
2012). For example, NASA scientists and engineers may direct their effort toward publishing
rather than completing mission-oriented tasks critical to NASA’s success. However, NASA
promotion rewards are much less salient compared to other forms of incentive pay that induce
gaming (e.g. sales bonuses) (Larkin 2014). The criteria for promotion is also ambiguous
compared to more specific pay-for-performance criteria such as sales targets. Finally, employee
interviews did not reveal any indications of gaming. The combination of these factors reduce
gaming concerns in this context.

1.8 Conclusion
Promotion rewards are one of the most common and important extrinsic incentives available to
employees (Cowgill 2014). Recent research has also documented that firms are flattening (Rajan
and Wulf 2006), which changes the nature of these rewards (flatter firms are more likely to have
larger promotion rewards). This chapter explored the relationship of promotion tournament
rewards to innovation and collaboration at NASA, a highly innovative public organization.
Results reveal a robust positive relationship between promotion tournament rewards and the
probability an employee publishes in an academic journal or generates a patent, which provides
circumstantial evidence for the theoretical effect of promotion tournaments on innovation.
Additionally, results reveal a robust negative relationship between promotion tournament size
and the presence of NASA publication co-authors. Results are generally supported when using
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employee fixed effects and instrumenting promotion tournament rewards with local housing
price. In combination, this is the first known research to provide empirical results in support of
the effect of promotion tournament rewards on individual innovation outcomes.
There are limitations to the inferences we can draw from the results. First, this analysis is
within a single public sector organization, which limits the external validity of the results.
However, NASA is a unique and innovative public sector organization and the results take into
account activity from ten different NASA locations that span across the US as well as many
different occupations that patent and publish in peer-reviewed journals. Second, we cannot rule
out endogeneity in the results and caution must be taken interpreting the results as causal.
However, care was taken to utilize fixed effects and controls to rule out many potential
alternative hypotheses as well as increase the causal case by instrumenting promotion
tournament rewards with local housing price.
The chapter contributes to multiple aspects of the innovation governance literature. First,
it is novel in embarking on the analysis of promotion tournaments on individual knowledge
worker innovation. The chapter opens the black box of promotion tournaments as a source of
heterogeneity in organizational innovation and complements previous work on knowledge
worker motivations (Stern 2004; Sauermann and Cohen 2010; Roach and Sauermann 2010;
Sauermann and Roach 2014) as well as the structure of extrinsic rewards (Manso 2011; Azoulay,
Graff Zivin, and Manso 2011; Ederer and Manso 2013).
Second, the results point to a non-obvious benefit of organizational scale: increased
freedom to structure promotion tournaments. This likely provides innovative returns to scale
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where most of the literature’s discussion of large organizations is based on their inability to
match the compensation incentives of smaller firms.
Third, the chapter has implications for knowledge transfer. It reveals that employees may
be more likely to rely on outside co-authors as promotion tournament rewards increase, which
may provide the benefit of access to external knowledge while also disseminating valuable
knowledge to outside entities. With respect to NASA, it has the potential to provide multiple
benefits toward their mission. It implies that larger promotion tournaments for NASA
employees may result in combining more disparate information that could lead to more break
through innovation (Fleming 2001; Murray and O’Mahony 2007). Likewise, it also provides a
more seamless transfer of knowledge from NASA to other academic and private sector
organizations. However, this may not be similarly beneficial for many private firms.
Lastly, the chapter connects to two broad literatures. It shows the value of investigating
the microfoundations of strategy by focusing on the interaction between levels of the
organization with a focus on the individual level (Felin, Foss, and Ployhart 2015; Barney and
Felin 2013). This chapter reveals interesting implications for the interaction of organizational
promotion structure and individual motivations. It also contributes to the literature on the
knowledge based view of the firm in that it recognizes that knowledge generation occurs at the
individual level (Grant 1996) and an important function of the organization is to efficiently
organize to create new knowledge (J. Nickerson and Zenger 2004). The chapter explores an
underdeveloped internal structure tool, promotion tournament rewards, that affects knowledge
generation. Overall, the chapter represents a step forward in understanding how promotion
tournaments may be effectively utilized to generate innovation in organizations.
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Chapter 2: Firm Ownership, Innovation
Strategy, and R&D Structure: The Effect of
Long-term Ownership on R&D Structure
2.1 Introduction
Centralized corporate research laboratories produced many landmark inventions that have
a significant impact on today’s society (e.g. transistor, nylon, etc.). However, these centralized
organizations seem to be a dying breed. Both the popular press (Tullo 2016; The Economist
2007) and academic research (Arora, Belenzon, and Patacconi 2017; Arora, Belenzon, and Rios
2014; Knott 2017) have called attention to the rise of decentralized R&D and its potential effect
on innovation and the creation of new knowledge. Differences in internal R&D structure result
in differences in the type of projects funded as well as how those projects are managed (Arora,
Belenzon, and Rios 2011). For example, decentralized R&D leads to less impactful innovation,
on average (Argyres and Silverman 2004), while likely leading to quicker returns and reduced
uncertainty. However, we know little about the cause of underlying differences in R&D
structure.
Two primary reasons limit our knowledge of R&D structure trends and the potential
causes of those trends. The first reason is that no large-scale open source measure of R&D
structure exists. Prior studies have utilized small sample surveys or the firm’s patenting policy
linked to proprietary subsidiary data (Argyres and Silverman 2004; Arora, Belenzon, and Rios
2014). The second reason is that most studies of R&D structure have focused on the impact
versus potential causes. The scarce literature investigating why firms decentralize R&D has
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largely focused on industry level differences (Arora, Belenzon, and Rios 2011, 2014) yet we
have little to explain why we see R&D structure heterogeneity within the same industry.
A primary explanation in the literature for the increase in decentralized R&D is that
markets have changed due to more competition and a narrow focus of firms due to globalization,
which leads to lower incentives for long-term strategic investment and lower returns to
combining knowledge across the organization (Arora, Belenzon, and Rios 2011). A second and
more pessimistic explanation is that impactful innovation is getting harder to generate which
leads to lower returns to centralized R&D. I argue in this chapter that the manager’s time
horizon – largely driven by firm ownership – is likely to affect the firm’s R&D structure. In
particular, a manager with a short-term time horizon is more likely to adopt a decentralized
structure with more certain outcomes and shorter time frames. This chapter investigates this
third explanation by asking the following question: How does long-term oriented ownership
affect R&D structure? Results indicate that long-term ownership does lead to comparative
increases in R&D centralization, which subsequently has significant implications for a firm’s
innovation outcomes.
Decision-making authority and budget control traditionally define formal R&D structure
(Argyres and Silverman 2004). A centralized R&D unit generates innovation for the entire
organization where the R&D leader reports directly to the corporate office. Conversely, leaders
in a decentralized R&D organization report through individual business units (DeSanctis, Glass,
and Ensing 2002). In addition, the corporate office controls R&D funding allocation in a
centralized structure while the business units control decentralized R&D funding. As a result,
centralized R&D is more likely to transfer knowledge across business units (Teece 1982) and
pursue non-specific projects (Kay 1988) leading to more impactful innovation with broader
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technical scope (Argyres and Silverman 2004). However, the nature of the innovation may also
lead to innovation that is more uncertain or difficult to appropriate due to its location between or
outside the current business units.
Impact and uncertainty are likely to affect managerial incentives in designing the firm’s
R&D structure. Greater innovation impact is likely to lead to longer lead times in appropriating
profits from innovation (Choudhury and Haas 2018; Marco, Sarnoff, and DeGrazia 2016).
Likewise, greater uncertainty is likely to produce fluctuations in performance. Managers with
myopic concerns – such as fear of dismissal or takeover – are likely to eschew both longer lead
times and greater uncertainty. Therefore, governance affecting managerial myopia is likely to
affect R&D structure decisions.
This chapter investigates heterogeneity in ownership as a source of governance affecting
myopia. Ownership blockholders exert significant influence in governing firms even if they
cannot directly intervene (Edmans 2009). Institutional investors are a prevalent blockholder and
have been shown to alleviate managerial myopia with their long-term orientation (Wahal and
McConnell 2000) leading to increases in innovation outcomes (Aghion, Van Reenen, and
Zingales 2013). This chapter pursues long-term ownership – proxied by institutional investors –
as a potential source of R&D structure heterogeneity.
This chapter contributes to the literature by first developing a measure of R&D structure
based on the location and collaboration characteristics of the firm’s patent inventors. More
specifically, each of the firm’s patent inventors is identified as either centralized or decentralized
through geographic location and collaborative behavior. The aggregate centralization of all
patent inventors sums to a firm-level measure of R&D structure each year a firm produces
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patents. The measure is qualitatively consistent with important attributes of R&D structure such
as the agglomeration of inventors and collaboration across business units discussed in the
previous paragraph. The measure is quantitatively validated with correlational evidence from
prior survey results (Argyres and Silverman 2004) as well as expected outcomes with respect to
innovation impact and complexity.
I empirically investigate the impact of institutional investors on R&D structure by first
examining the basic relationship between percent institutional ownership and R&D structure.
Statistical estimates indicate a positive relationship between institutional investors and R&D
centralization even when looking at within-industry differences. However, it is possible that
long-term institutional investors choose to invest in firms with centralized R&D. Thus, the
results may be due to reverse causality. To alleviate this concern, I generate causal evidence by
instrumenting institutional investors with the firm’s inclusion into the S&P 500, which leads to
an increase in institutional investors. Instrumental variable estimates corroborate the basic
results, which provides support for a causal relationship. Finally, I stratify institutional investors
by type as identified by Bushee (1998). As expected, dedicated institutional investors are
associated with an increase in centralization while transient institutional investors are associated
with a decrease in centralization.
This chapter provides a first attempt at understanding how firm ownership patterns may
affect innovation strategy through the decision of R&D structure. These results have significant
implications for firm managers. First, managerial myopia likely contributes to R&D structure
decisions because firms with more long-term oriented ownership are comparatively more
centralized. The normative implication is that firms may be able to influence the firm’s type of
ownership and/or governance, which could lead to more impactful innovation and long-term
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growth. For example, firms can court dedicated institutional investors in hopes of pursuing more
long-term strategies. Other governance mechanisms can be employed (e.g. long-term incentive
compensation) to provide managers with the incentives to pursue such strategies. However, the
benefit from centralization may also depend on the industry as well as the firm’s capabilities and
innovation problems.

2.2 Background
Organizational structure decisions have been a central topic in strategic management since
Chandler’s (1962) seminal book Strategy and Structure. Recent attention has focused on various
attributes of firm’ structure including the flattening of firms (Rajan and Wulf 2006) and the
decentralization of the firm’s overall structure (Acemoglu et al. 2007). In this tradition,
academic research has recently begun to unwrap the potential impact of the firm’s centralized
versus decentralized R&D structure decision (Argyres and Silverman 2004; Leiponen and Helfat
2011; Lerner and Wulf 2007; Arora, Belenzon, and Rios 2011, 2014; Knott 2017). Centralized
R&D laboratories such as Bell Labs and Xerox Parc have become legendary due to their
contributions to the invention of society-altering products such as transistors and personal
computers. These research breakthroughs are likely because centralized corporate research
generates different types of knowledge in comparison to decentralized R&D with respect to the
basic nature of the technology, the spillovers across business units, and the internal sourcing of
the technology (Knott 2017).
Formally centralized research firms organize their R&D such that a single unit produces
R&D for the entire firm and reports to the corporate office rather than individual business units.
The centralization of knowledge results in increased breadth of search from the ease of
communication and relationships among the firm’s researchers as well as innovations that span
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across or outside the scope of the firm’s business units (Argyres and Silverman 2004).
Alternatively, decentralized research organizes R&D to report through individual business units.
This reporting structure results in a higher likelihood that innovation is pursued that directly
benefits the individual business unit, leading to less breadth and impact outside that particular
unit. Thus, the firm’s tradeoff is in the probability and speed of the innovation’s success within
the firm versus the impact of the innovation which has been shown to be broader and more basic
for centralized R&D (Arora, Belenzon, and Rios 2011). More recent literature has also linked
decentralized R&D to more internalized innovation while being reliant on mergers and
acquisitions for a larger proportion of patents (Arora, Belenzon, and Rios 2014).
In contrast to formal R&D structure, the literature defines a firm’s informal R&D
structure less precisely. In general, informal R&D structure is the organization of a firm’s R&D
that does not rely on formal rules in the reporting structure (e.g. formal hierarchies, etc.). One
proposed attribute of informal R&D structure researched in the innovation literature is the
geographic dispersion of the firm’s inventors and its effect on innovation (Singh 2008; Leiponen
and Helfat 2011). Firms have the choice of agglomerating their inventors in a geographic
location or dispersing those inventors across geographic regions. Singh (2008), in particular,
investigates this phenomenon by focusing on the effect of collaboration on innovation. The
author argues that inventor geographic dispersion relates to but is not the same as formal R&D
structure and defines it as informal R&D structure. The working hypothesis in the paper is that
firms with dispersed inventors will have access to more diverse knowledge sets due to the
distribution of knowledge across geographic regions. This hypothesis leads to a prediction of
greater innovation impact with more geographic dispersion. Interestingly, results indicate the
opposite. Firms with geographically dispersed inventors have patents with lower impact
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compared to those with geographically agglomerated inventors. The effect of dispersed
inventors displays a positive impact only when inventors collaborate across geographic regions.
In essence, knowledge must be centralized or shared to generate positive returns to dispersed
knowledge access. This concept of differences in dispersed knowledge also relates to additional
research showing geographically dispersed R&D yields more imitation rather than novel
innovation (Leiponen and Helfat 2011).
More recent innovation research further develops the idea of mechanisms that centralize
dispersed inventor knowledge sets. Lahiri (2010) shows that intra-organizational linkages
positively moderate the success of geographically dispersed R&D. Similarly, Choudhury (2017)
shows that intra-firm mobility plays a key role in the impact of dispersed R&D. These studies
reveal that a mechanism to centralize knowledge is important for the combination of dispersed
inventors (and dispersed knowledge sets) in valuable ways. The intra-firm linkages allow for the
combination of knowledge, which may potentially lead to novel innovation at the intersection of
the knowledge sets.
The literature on both inventor dispersion/collaboration and formal R&D structure has
argued that inventor geographic location and collaboration is related but not a direct measure of
formal R&D structure (Singh 2008; Arora, Belenzon, and Rios 2011, 2014). While this
relationship is clearly the case, anything other than a direct measure of a firm’s formal R&D
structure falls short with this definition and no such measure exists outside of small sample
survey data with their associated shortcomings. I subsequently argue with two main points that
the intuition and empirical record of geographic dispersion and collaboration indicate it is a
reasonable proxy for formal R&D structure. In addition, I present empirical validation of this
assertion in the data and methods section.
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The first point is that decentralized inventors are empirically associated with less
impactful and more imitative innovation (Singh 2008; Leiponen and Helfat 2011). This potential
impact of geographic decentralization is consistent with formal R&D decentralization outcomes
and in contrast to inventor dispersion as a mechanism to access dispersed knowledge sets. The
intuition is also consistent with the likelihood of formally centralized organizations
agglomerating at a single site or metropolitan area.
The second point is that when inventors are dispersed, innovation is more impactful when
knowledge is shared across geographic regions rather than self-contained within the geographic
region (Singh 2008; Choudhury 2017; Lahiri 2010). This centralization of knowledge is also
empirically consistent with the expectations of a formally centralized R&D organization. In
addition, knowledge sharing is also consistent with the intuition of a formally centralized
organization. Multi-business firms commonly disperse business units across geographic regions
to access different resources or customer bases. Knowledge sharing across geographic regions
indicates the potential knowledge sharing across business units, which is consistent with formal
R&D centralization. Thus, I argue that prior studies on inventor dispersion and collaboration
actually point to these attributes of informal R&D structure as proxies for formal R&D structure.
The minimal literature investigating why firms decentralize R&D has focused on firm
and industry level differences (Arora, Belenzon, and Rios 2011, 2014). More diversified firms
have less ability to capture spillovers across business units which leads to a more decentralize
R&D structure (Arora, Belenzon, and Rios 2011). The decreased benefit of centralizing
knowledge makes logical sense if we imagine the benefits of R&D structure shifting with the
firm’s ability to benefit from combining information across the enterprise. When the enterprise
is very diverse, the potential that any single combination will create value becomes less likely.
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Similarly, firms in more complex industries (e.g. telecommunications) are shown to have more
centralized R&D while those in discrete industries are more decentralized (Arora, Belenzon, and
Rios 2011). The disincentive to combine knowledge across discrete businesses, once again,
makes logical sense if we envision complexity making it less likely that innovation from any of
the firm’s business unit silos will be valuable. The need to combine knowledge across business
units to create value increases the firm’s desire to centralize R&D. While these first steps in
understanding why firms may differ in their R&D structure are informative, we have little
understanding of why firms in the same industry and with similar levels of diversification differ
in their R&D structure.

2.3 Hypothesis Development
Managerial myopia is particularly concerning with respect to R&D because of the nature
of the appropriation time horizon of expenditures. The firm incurs R&D expenditures in the
current period yet the revenue gained from R&D accrues in future periods. Thus, CEOs with
short-term myopic concerns can increase profits in the short-term by cutting R&D expenditures
at the expense of long-term innovation or invest in certain types of R&D projects that may lead
to quicker returns at the expense of impactful innovation (Laverty 1996).
Firms have developed governance mechanisms such as long-term incentive compensation
and takeover provisions to combat myopia by attempting to align managerial incentives with the
shareholders (Becker-Blease 2011; Gormley, Matsa, and Milbourn 2013; Lerner and Wulf 2007).
However, shareholders themselves may differ in their time horizons. For instance, shareholders
with a long-term investment orientation may free managers to pursue long-term innovation at the
expense of short-term profits. The result of this type of ownership orientation is demonstrated by
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innovation increases in firms with higher CEO and institutional investor ownership (Bange and
De Bondt 1998; Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales 2013; Bushee 1998).
Blockholders – such as institutional investors – can exert significant influence even in the
absence of direct intervention (Edmans 2009). Institutional investors, in particular, have been
shown to decrease the probability of firing a CEO after a single quarter’s poor performance
which leads to a decrease in career concerns and an increase in long term orientation (Aghion,
Van Reenen, and Zingales 2013; Wahal and McConnell 2000). Empirical studies have
demonstrated results attributed to this long-term orientation such as increased R&D spending and
innovation impact with institutional investors (Baysinger, Kosnik, and Turk 1991; Aghion, Van
Reenen, and Zingales 2013). Thus, a matching process exists between heterogeneous
shareholder interests and governance to generate innovation.
A second corollary to the incentive and governance to innovate is how the firm’s
managers will generate innovation given their heterogeneous desires. One potential way in
which a manager can generate long-term innovation is through involvement in the decision
making process for all innovation projects. However, we know that managerial resources are
scarce which makes it illogical that a CEO can be involved in every firm decision (Penrose 1959;
Garicano 2000). A more likely explanation is that executives will design the organization to
carry out their innovation wishes when delegating decision-making. Management involvement
in organization design is consistent with top management teams making strategic decisions and
delegating day-to-day decision making throughout the hierarchy. As discussed in the previous
section, a key strategic innovation decision is constructing the firm’s R&D structure.
Centralized R&D structures are likely to be associated with less myopic management and
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decentralized R&D structures are likely to be associated with more myopic management, which
leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Firms with a larger proportion of long-term oriented ownership will have a
comparatively centralized R&D structure.
I investigate this hypothesis in the context of institutional investors. As previously stated,
evidence indicates the presence of institutional investors correlates with increases in innovation
by lowering CEO career concerns (Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales 2013; Wahal and
McConnell 2000; Baysinger, Kosnik, and Turk 1991). Aghion (2013) argues that decreasing
career concerns (the worry about career implications of short-term profit downturns, etc.) will
free managers to pursue riskier and longer-term innovation. This chapter argues that a decrease
in career concerns will also increase the probability that managers will choose a riskier and
longer-term oriented R&D structure (centralized R&D). Research also reveals that institutional
investors vary in the level of their time horizon orientation which leads to different firm
behaviors (Bushee 1998). Bushee (1998) classifies individual institutional investors into four
categories based on their investment behavior: dedicated investors, quasi-indexers, transient
investors, and unknown investors. The first three categories are in order of their orientation with
dedicated institutional investors as the least myopic and transient as the most myopic with quasiindexers in between. The orientation of institutional investors leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Firms with a higher proportion of dedicated institutional investors will have a
more centralized R&D structure compared with firms having a higher proportion of transient
institutional investors.
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I investigate these two hypotheses using a novel measure of R&D structure as well as detailed
data on the firm’s investor type.

2.4 Data and Methods
The chapter makes two empirical contributions, which I will outline in this section. First, I
develop a novel measure of R&D structure and substantiate it with prior small sample survey
data as well as expected innovation outcomes. Second, I test the hypothesized effect of
ownership type on R&D structure with institutional investor data. The final data set consists of
multiple data sources. This section details the use of those sources as well as the key measures
developed. Table 2.1 summarizes the data sources, descriptions, and uses.
-------------------------------------------Insert Table 2.1 about here
--------------------------------------------The base source is detailed patent data for all patents granted from 1976 to the present from the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) website11. The data includes all patent
information utilized in this study such as inventor location, patent citations, patent claims, patent
type, number of inventors, etc. However, the patent information only contains a federal
information processing standard (FIPS) state-county location indicator for the home address of
each inventor. Inventors with home addresses in different FIPS may potentially work side-byside at the same facility. For instance, an inventor that lives in Kansas City, Missouri, and an
inventor that lives in Kansas City, Kansas, have different FIPS but are located in the same
metropolitan area. The National Bureau for Economic Research (NBER) has generated a
crosswalk to convert FIPS to core based metropolitan areas (CBSAs) which I utilize to identify
11

https://www.uspto.gov/
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patent inventors that reside in the same metropolitan area12. NBER also provides a crosswalk
between patent assignees (the organization filing the patent) and firm-level identifiers (gvkey)
for the years 1976-2006. The chapter utilizes this assignee crosswalk and extends it to future
years to identify firms within the patent data and link them to firm-level information and
accounting data from Compustat. Thus, the chapter links firm-year patents to additional firmlevel variables. The paper integrates institutional investor data by ticker symbol using the
Thompson Reuters Institutional (13f) Holdings Database included in the Wharton Research
Database Services (WRDS). Following Bushee (1998), and utilizing data provided from the
author’s website13, each institutional investor is stratified by investment type (dedicated, quasiindexer, transient, unknown). The final data utilized in this study is the 1994 IRI Survey of R&D
heads also utilized in Argyres and Silverman (2004) and provided by the authors. The chapter
uses this data as a robustness check of the R&D structure measure generated in this chapter
compared to the actual answers given by corresponding R&D managers. Table 2.2 provides the
summary statistics of the aggregated data.
-------------------------------------------Insert Table 2.2 about here
--------------------------------------------One barrier to the study of R&D structure is the lack of a reliable, large scale, and open
source proxy measure. Prior measures utilized in the literature include small sample survey data
and rules associated with patenting behavior. Argyres & Silverman (2004) utilize a survey
collected in 1994 by the firm IRI that asks the R&D head of 83 large firms to identify aspects of

12
13

http://www.nber.org/data/cbsa-fips-county-crosswalk.html
http://acct.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/IIclass.html
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their firm’s R&D reporting structure and funding allocation. The authors classify the survey
answers of R&D structure on a five-point scale from centralized to decentralized with middle
categories of centralized hybrid, balanced hybrid, and decentralized hybrid. This study was a
clear step forward in our theoretical and empirical understanding of the impact of R&D structure.
However, the nature of smaller sample survey data results in cross-sectional data at a point in
time. This results in the inability to study changes in structure over time and difficulty in
generating causal inference.
A more recent study utilized a novel proxy for R&D structure based on the firm’s rules
associated with assigning patents (Arora, Belenzon, and Rios 2014). This study uses the
relationship of parent firms and subsidiaries to generate behavioral differences in assigning
patents to the parent firm or the subsidiary. More specifically, if a firm assigns a higher
proportion of patents generated to its subsidiaries, the authors classify the firm as comparatively
decentralized with this rule as a proxy for a more formal reporting structure. Alternatively, if a
firm assigns a higher proportion of patents to the parent then the authors classify the organization
as comparatively centralized. This study, once again, was a step forward in our understanding of
R&D structure as the authors utilize this measure to further our understanding of what industry
and firm characteristics lead to differences in R&D structure. However, issues exist with the
availability and potential reliability of the patent-based measure, which I aim to overcome in this
study. First, the authors use a proprietary subscription database to generate the parent-subsidiary
structure, which precludes the ability of a large proportion of researchers from accessing the
measure. Second, measuring R&D structure only at the parent-subsidiary threshold has the
potential to misidentify firms that have multiple business units under the parent firm. For
instance, the aircraft manufacturer Boeing has both a commercial aircraft division and
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defense/space/security division under the parent corporation. If Boeing performed decentralized
R&D in both the commercial and defense business units and assigned them to the parent
organization, it would appear centralized yet actually be a decentralized R&D structure. The
assumption with this measure is that decentralization occurs at the subsidiary level rather than
business units within the parent corporation which is likely not the case in many instances. The
third potential concern with the measure is the likelihood of picking up merger and acquisition
activity rather than decentralization. Acquiring firms integrate many M&A targets as
subsidiaries to the parent firm and this measure has the potential to focus on acquisition-oriented
firms rather than the whole spectrum of decentralized firms.
In light of the small sample, proprietary data, and parent-subsidiary discussion of prior
measures, this chapter details steps taken to construct a proxy for R&D structure based on
insights and evidence presented in the background section. The basic premise is that the chapter
classifies each inventor within a firm in any given year as either centralized or decentralized
based on two criteria. The first criterion for a centralized inventor is that the inventor resides
within the metropolitan area that contains the highest proportion of the firm’s inventors. I
generate the most frequent metropolitan area from the mode CBSA of patent inventors for each
firm-year. A dummy variable is generated for each inventor equal to one if the inventor is
located in the most frequent CBSA and zero if not. Table 2.2 shows that the mean firm had
58.6% of its inventors in a single metropolitan area. The second criterion is the cross-geographic
collaboration of inventors not located in this main CBSA. The chapter also classifies an inventor
as centralized if they collaborated on a patent with an inventor located in the main CBSA. The
chapter utilizes these two criteria to generate the main measure of Firm R&D Centralization, the
aggregate proportion of centralized inventors in a firm-year. This continuous measure from 0 to
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1 has a mean of 0.712 as shown in Table 2.2. The data in Table 2.2 and subsequent empirical
analyses are restricted only to firms with more than one patent in any given year as a single
patent deterministically results in a fully centralized firm. I detail the robustness of this measure
and the result of ownership on R&D structure in the following section.

2.5 Discussion of Empirical Results
The following is a summary of the empirical analyses performed in this chapter. Tables 2.3 and
2.4 test the robustness of the R&D structure proxy with Table 2.3 testing the correlation of the
measure with prior survey results and Table 2.4 testing the relationship of the measure to
attributes of patent outcomes. Table 2.5 corroborates the relationship of institutional investors to
patent attributes generated in prior literature. Table 2.6 tests the hypothesis that long-term
ownership (institutional investors) leads to a relative increase in centralization (Hypothesis 1).
Finally, Table 2.7 tests Hypothesis 2 with stratified institutional investor data. The chapter
performs all analyses at the patent observation level with errors clustered at the firm level to
control for patent attributes; however, the basic relationship holds with firm-level data.
The contribution - and to some extent the novelty - of this chapter relies on the robustness
of the open source proxy for R&D structure. The first test of the robustness of the measure is to
compare it to the most reliable information on firm R&D structure: the 1994 IRI survey of R&D
heads used in Argyres and Silverman (2004). The survey led to R&D structure classified on a
five-point scale from most centralized to decentralized. These results were re-organized in
increasing centralization with 1 representing the most decentralized firms and 5 the most
centralized firms to coincide with the ascending measure of centralization developed in this
chapter (although on different scales). The comparison set of firms from the survey includes 54
firms that are both public and produced more than one patent in 1994. Table 2.3 shows the
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regression results. Results reveal a positive and statistically significant relationship between the
measure and the survey results. The large coefficient also gives confidence that there is a
correlation across a significant spectrum of the decentralization-centralization range.
-------------------------------------------Insert Table 2.3 about here
--------------------------------------------A second robustness check for the R&D structure proxy is to investigate the correlation
between the measure and expected innovation outcomes. For instance, more centralized
organizations generate innovation with more impact and greater complexity, on average, due to
the combination of knowledge sets across the organization. Patent citations and patent claims
are reasonable and accepted proxies of impact and complexity (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg
2005; Choudhury and Haas 2018). The expectation is that centralized organizations are
associated with patents of higher impact and complexity. Table 2.4 summarizes these results.
-------------------------------------------Insert Table 2.4 about here
--------------------------------------------Table 2.4 reveals a positive relationship between the proxy for centralized R&D and both patent
impact and complexity. All models have year and industry dummy variables and cluster errors
by firm with a Poisson model due to the count nature of the dependent variable. Both reveal a
positive and statistically significant relationship. The combined results in Tables 2.3 and 2.4
provide strong circumstantial evidence for the R&D structure proxy developed in this chapter.
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After generating confidence in the R&D structure measure, we will now focus on the role
of institutional investors on R&D structure. Prior literature has demonstrated a positive
relationship between institutional investors and innovation (Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales
2013; Baysinger, Kosnik, and Turk 1991). Table 2.5 tests this basic relationship in the data.
-------------------------------------------Insert Table 2.5 about here
--------------------------------------------Table 2.5 reveals a positive relationship between institutional investors and both patent impact
and complexity, which is consistent with prior literature. The results are robust to the inclusion
of size and patent controls as well as year and industry dummies. These results give confidence
in the basic premise that long-term ownership is associated with greater innovation outcomes.
Given that long-term ownership is associated with increases in innovation outcomes, I
test Hypothesis 1 by analyzing the relationship between institutional investors and R&D
structure in Table 2.6. Column 1 reveals a positive and statistically significant relationship
between institutional ownership and R&D centralization when controlling for size, patent
attributes, time, and clustering errors by firm. Column 2 shows little difference in the magnitude
and significance of the coefficient when integrating additional control variables.
-------------------------------------------Insert Table 2.6 about here
--------------------------------------------Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.6 reveal correlational evidence that is consistent with Hypothesis 1.
However, alternative explanations exist that could account for these results. For instance,
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institutional investors may invest in firms with more centralization R&D structures. To alleviate
these concerns, I utilize an instrumental variable for institutional investors in columns 3 and 4.
Prior studies have utilized the inclusion of a firm into the S&P 500 as an instrument for
institutional investors (Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales 2013). The premise is that inclusion
into the S&P 500 generates an increase in institutional investors, largely due to index funds. The
second assumption with the use of the inclusion in the S&P 500 as an instrument for institutional
investors is that a firm’s inclusion in this category will not directly affect the R&D structure of
the firm (correlate with the errors), which seems a reasonable assumption. Thus, I assume that
R&D structure from inclusion in the S&P 500 is due to the increase in institutional investors.
Columns 3 and 4 utilize this instrument and reveal a positive effect of institutional
ownership on R&D centralization which supports Hypothesis 1 both without (column 3) and
with (column 4) industry controls. The magnitude of the causal relationship is actually larger
than the basic OLS models, indicating that endogeneity may be biasing the naïve coefficient
downward. F tests of the instrument reveal a robust correlation of inclusion in the S&P 500 to
institutional investors with coefficients of 13.4 and 18.2 for the models shown in column 3 and 4
respectively.
Institutional investors themselves display heterogeneity in their time horizon orientation
(Bushee 1998). Hypothesis 2 exploits this variation to predict that longer-term institutional
investors will lead to relatively more R&D centralization compared to transient investors that
move in and out of stocks on a regular basis. Table 2.7 utilizes the stratified data to test the
hypothesis.
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-------------------------------------------Insert Table 2.7 about here
--------------------------------------------Column 1 shows a positive and statistically significant relationship between dedicated and quasiindexer institutional investors with R&D centralization while being insignificant for transient
investors. The magnitude of the coefficients is consistent with Hypothesis 2: dedicated investors
have the largest magnitude followed by quasi-indexers and finally by transient investors.
Column 2 integrates additional controls and reveals similar results, as does the inclusion of
industry dummy variables in column 3 and with a logit model in column 4. Columns 5 through 8
utilize the S&P 500 inclusion to instrument for dedicated institutional investors. Columns 5 and
6 utilize only dedicated institutional investors without (column 5) and with (column 6) industry
dummy variables and reveal a positive relationship of dedicated institutional investors to R&D
centralization. Columns 7 and 8 add the other investor types. The dedicated investors positively
affect R&D centralization while the quasi-indexers have little to no comparative effect.
However, the most interesting result is with transient investors. When using the instrument,
these myopic investors lead to more decentralized R&D. F tests for all instrumental variable
models show a strong correlation between the instrument and endogenous variable. In
aggregate, these results strongly support Hypothesis 2. The discussion of these results and
potential implications follow in the next section.

2.6 Implications
This chapter corroborates prior literature by showing R&D centralization leads to innovation that
is more impactful. If so, why are firms decentralizing? As previously discussed, firm
decentralization may be the result of industry forces, dwindling opportunities, or myopic
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managerial behavior. The findings in this chapter support that this decision, at least in part, is
driven by managerial myopia. However, all three likely play a part in the R&D structure
decision. Globalization is likely narrowing firm scope, which provides lower returns to
centralized R&D (Arora, Belenzon, and Rios 2011). Firms in maturing industries likely generate
dwindling returns to centralized R&D. However, the pressure to meet next quarter’s earnings are
likely to create myopic incentives that can be detrimental to long-term strategy (Laverty 1996;
Zhang and Gimeno 2016). Even if a CEO desires to create long-term value for the firm,
incentives created by shareholders may make that a difficult proposition. This chapter sheds
light on the potential that investor’ time horizon may lead not only to the funding of different
projects but fundamentally different R&D structure altogether.
The implication is that there may be an optimal match between investors and firms with
respect to innovation governance. Short-term investors are likely to align with firms that are not
technologically intensive or that will not receive returns to centralized R&D. Examples of such
firms include those in mature industries, with narrow businesses, or with discrete technologies.
Conversely, long-term investors are likely to align with firms that will generate significant gains
to centralization. Examples include firms with significant complementarities between
technologies and firms on the technological frontier. What can firms do to avoid this potentially
costly mismatch? One potential strategy is to directly court institutional or other long-term
investors. A second strategy is to indirectly court long-term investors by creating
complementary long-term governance mechanisms within the firm such as takeover provisions
or long-term incentive compensation.
More broadly, this chapter is a next step in shedding light on why firms differ in their
R&D structure. Long-term ownership not only increases innovation at the firm but also can
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fundamentally change the strategy and structure of the firm’s R&D activities. Indications are
that ownership leads to a strategic shift in firms, which subsequently leads to a structural change
in R&D. Interestingly, this has echoes of Chandler’s insights that structure follows strategy.

2.7 Conclusion
This chapter explored the effect of long-term ownership on R&D structure. An open source
proxy measure was developed for R&D structure utilizing patent inventors within the firm to
determine if individual inventors were centralized geographically or collaboratively. The
measure was validated with correlation evidence from prior survey results as well as through
correlational evidence of expected increases in innovation impact and complexity with
centralized R&D. Institutional investor ownership was used as a measure of long-term
ownership and correlational evidence supports a comparative shift toward R&D centralization
with increased institutional investor ownership. Causal evidence was generated utilizing S&P
500 entry as an instrument. Finally, institutional investors were stratified based on their revealed
short-term versus long-term investment behavior. Institutional investors with the most long-term
investment orientation (dedicated investors) led to the greatest shift toward R&D centralization
while investors with the most short-term investment orientation (transient investors) led to a shift
toward R&D decentralization. These results broadly support that long-term ownership leads not
only to a shift in innovation but also to a shift in innovation strategy through R&D structure.
This chapter makes multiple contributes to the innovation governance literature. First, it
generates an open source proxy for R&D structure that can enable future study. Second, it
establishes the positive effect of long-term ownership on R&D structure. Third, it establishes
managerial myopia as a potential mechanism for heterogeneity in R&D structure. Fourth, it
generates normative implications for matching the firm’s innovative opportunities with
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ownership orientation and governance. More broadly, the chapter contributes to the knowledgebased view of the firm in focusing on differences in internal organization on the production of
knowledge (Grant 1996). I hope that this chapter will reinvigorate the discussion of R&D
structure in generating more impactful innovation for both firms and society.
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Chapter 3: A New Direction or Lack of
Direction? The Story of Innovation with
Outsider CEOs (w/ Leonardo Klüppel)
3.1 Introduction
Recent management literature has begun to explore the importance of CEO heterogeneity
on firm innovation outcomes (Balsmeier and Buchwald, 2014; Cummings and Knott, 2018;
Galasso and Simcoe, 2011; Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh, 2012). One observable and important
difference between CEOs is the presence or lack of internal firm and industry specific skills and
experience (Harris and Helfat, 1997). Interestingly, the hiring of CEOs without internal
experience has dramatically increased over the last thirty years (see Figure 3.1), which
underscores the importance of fully understanding this phenomenon. The extant literature has
asserted that outside CEOs are associated with lower patent impact (Balsmeier and Buchwald,
2014) and decreased R&D productivity (Cummings and Knott, 2018), yet there is little evidence
of the mechanisms behind that deleterious effect. This chapter explores changes in the direction
of R&D to understand how and when outside CEOs affect firm innovation. Results surprisingly
indicate that outside CEOs change innovation less than their inside counterparts, contrary to the
literature linking external CEO succession to organizational change (Virany et al., 1992; Zhang
and Rajagopalan, 2010).
-------------------------------------------Insert Figure 3.1 about here
--------------------------------------------88

A firm’s innovation path depends heavily on the CEO’s experience, knowledge, and
beliefs about the world (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Those characteristics are impacted by a
multitude of experiences in the life of the CEO, as varied as living through economic depressions
(Malmendier and Nagel, 2011) to his/her functional experiences (Crossland et al., 2014). Past
employment can also change the way CEOs process and respond to new information.
Experiences beyond the focal firm and industry can also change the CEO’s commitment to the
firm’s current strategy (Hambrick, Geletkanycz, and Fredrickson, 1993) and strategic
distinctiveness from industry competitors (Crossland et al., 2014).
External hires bring new information and perspectives to the firm, impacting its
innovation output (Aime et al., 2010; Görg and Strobl, 2005; Kaiser, Kongsted, and Rønde,
2015; Lewis and Yao, 2006). Although all external hires are possible sources of changes in
innovation practices, the CEO is a special case. In addition to having a large impact on firm
performance (Mackey, 2008), the CEO sits at the top of the organizational chart, a privileged
position to spot resource complementarities across all business units and engage in long term
planning (Chandler, 1962). For those reasons, the CEO is uniquely suited for guiding the firm’s
innovation direction.
We generate four hypotheses that predict firms with outside CEOs will usher in more
innovation change and that the size of the R&D organization, the decentralization of the R&D
organization, and the distance of the CEO’s prior experience reduces the CEO’s impact. To
explore our hypotheses, we utilize detailed executive employment records across time from
Execucomp to identify CEOs hired from another firm (outside CEOs) and CEOs hired from
within the firm (inside CEOs). We then use USPTO patent data to construct a multi-dimensional
vector of each firm’s yearly patents to explore differences in innovation direction between firms
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with outside and inside CEOs. Extant literature indicates that firms hire outside CEOs to make
changes (Virany, Tushman, and Romanelli, 1992; Zhang and Rajagopalan, 2010), which is likely
to manifest in a shift in innovation direction. However, our empirical analysis indicates that
firms with outside CEOs change less (lower relative change in the firm’s patent vector direction
across time) compared to firms with their inside counterparts. This relationship holds when
using a propensity score matching model. We also find evidence that decentralization of the
firm’s R&D structure – leading to decreased CEO influence – also decreases the magnitude of
the results. This evidence in organizations where CEOs wield more power of the R&D
organization provides further circumstantial evidence that the CEO is, at least in part, causing the
effect. Taken together, our results surprisingly indicate that outside CEOs do not take the firm in
a new innovative direction but rather may generate a lack of innovative direction for the firm.
These results have important implications for firms. In particular, firms that hire outside
CEOs should fully take into account the potential consequences, which may include not only a
decrease in innovation but also the inability or lack of desire to take the firm’s innovation in a
new direction. However, we caveat these findings in three ways. First, although we utilize
propensity score matching and firm structure to strengthen the circumstantial case, we caution
interpreting the relationship as causal because the assignment of outside CEOs to firms is not
random. Second, this chapter utilizes a firm’s patent vector to proxy for innovation direction yet
many firms do not patent and patenting likely does not account for the entirety of the firm’s
innovation. Third, we caution firms from interpreting the results as a prescription not to hire
outside CEOs. In fact, outside CEOs likely have valuable capabilities other than innovation for
which the firm should consider.
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This chapter contributes to multiple literature streams including innovation and CEO
heterogeneity by finding the surprising result that outside CEOs may decrease innovation change
in firms. The chapter also contributes to firm innovation governance literature by finding a new
potential impact of CEO succession choice (innovation direction) and identifying organizational
characteristics that act to intensify or mute that potential impact.

3.2 Background
A renewed focus exists in the literature on investigating how managerial differences translate
into firm performance differences (Bandiera et al., 2017; Bloom et al., 2013; Malmendier and
Tate, 2005; Malmendier, Tate, and Yan, 2011). A key managerial task is leading the long-term
firm strategy which depends on his/her mental map about where the best opportunities for profit
are located (Nickerson and Zenger, 2004; Siggelkow and Rivkin, 2005) and on the information
gathered and interpreted by the CEO about the world. One of the firm’s fundamental tools to
achieve a desired long-term objective in a competitive market is the management of the R&D
function. With R&D, the firm can create a capability bundle that delivers an expected future
market position. Therefore, it is natural to think that the CEO’s characteristics and the direction
of the firm’s innovation intimately connect, even if the CEO is not directly dictating what
research projects to pursue next.
The broader connection between the CEO and firm innovation has received significant
attention in the literature. These studies provide evidence that CEOs do affect the firm’s
innovation and that understanding differences in these CEOs and how to govern them is key to
any firm’s innovation strategy. First, the literature shows that changes in the CEO’s incentive to
innovate lead to changes in innovative output. The most direct evidence in this spirit is research
that shows CEO’s with greater long term incentive compensation increase firm innovative output
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(Gormley, Matsa, and Milbourn, 2013; Lerner and Wulf, 2007; Makri, Lane, and Gomez-Mejia,
2006). In this same thinking, research on CEO (Bange and De Bondt, 1998) and institutional
ownership (Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales, 2013) also links ownership incentives with
greater innovative performance. Other governance factors also change the long-term versus
short-term outlook horizon for CEOs, which has implications for innovation. Research shows
that higher firm liquidity (Fang, Tian, and Tice, 2014), weaker takeover provisions (BeckerBlease, 2011), and higher analyst coverage (Yu, 2008) all increase CEO short-termism which
leads to a decrease in innovation due to its long-term nature. Taken together, the evidence
indicates that governance of the CEO affects the firm’s innovative performance, which implicitly
assumes that CEOs have significant influence over the firm’s innovation.
The literature has also studied how heterogeneous personal CEO traits affects innovation. A
simple example of differences across CEOs is the effect of age on firm innovation. As CEOs
approach retirement age, their ability to gain from the firm’s long-term innovation time horizon
decreases which should lead to a focus on more short-term activities. Research shows that this is
the case in the absence of long-term incentives to mute the impact (Dechow and Sloan, 1991).
Heterogeneity in the CEO’s perception of risk also affects firm innovation. The lack of portfolio
diversification of CEOs compared to shareholders (due to the stickiness of firm-specific career
investment) likely leads to a departure in the risk appetite between the two. However,
overconfident CEOs that underestimate innovation risk are likely to increase firm innovation,
which provides more alignment with shareholders. Research using the CEO’s stock option
exercising behavior when the options are “in the money” (Malmendier and Tate, 2005) indicates
that this is the case (Galasso and Simcoe, 2011; Hirshleifer et al., 2012). These research
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examples indicate that not only do CEOs have influence over firm innovation but also that
differences in these CEOs may result in heterogeneous firm innovation outcomes.
The firm’s CEO succession decision intersects both the literature on the firm’s governance of
innovation (Aghion et al., 2013; Becker-Blease, 2011; Fang et al., 2014; Gormley et al., 2013;
Lerner and Wulf, 2007; Yu, 2008) as well as literature on the potential effect of CEO
heterogeneity (Balsmeier and Buchwald, 2014; Cummings and Knott, 2018; Dechow and Sloan,
1991; Galasso and Simcoe, 2011; Hirshleifer et al., 2012). Firms must make tradeoffs in the
succession choice that spans across all aspects of the enterprise. One such tradeoff is the
decision to hire a CEO from inside the organization versus broadening the pool of applicants to
hire outside the organization. Inside CEO’s provide firm and industry knowledge, contacts, and
skills as well as increase motivation of future potential candidates inside the firm (Harris and
Helfat, 1997; Howard, 2001). Inside CEO’s also decrease information asymmetry between the
potential CEO and firm (Zajac, 1990) which can lead to less turbulence (Zhang and Rajagopalan,
2004). Conversely, firms look outside the organization to increase the applicant pool and acquire
knowledge from outside the firm and industry (Virany et al., 1992; Zhang, 2008; Zhang and
Rajagopalan, 2010). These tradeoffs indicate that the choice of inside versus outside CEO is
likely not universally beneficial for firm performance which is corroborated by the empirical
record (Lubatkin et al., 1986; Shen and Cannella, 2002; Worrell and Davidson III, 1987; Zajac,
1990; Zhang, 2008).
The association of inside versus outside CEOs to innovation has been investigated in the
literature to find that outside CEOs are associated with decreased patenting activity (Balsmeier
and Buchwald, 2014) as well as a decrease in R&D productivity (Cummings and Knott, 2018).
These studies attribute the lack of firm and industry-specific technological expertise to these
93

outcomes. Balsmeier and Buchwald utilize a small sample of German firms in the early 2000s to
analyze the patenting implications associated with this decision and find that firms with outside
CEOs patent less and with less impact. Cummings and Knott utilize a broader sample of US
firms and find that outside CEOs are associated with degraded RQ (R&D productivity) and this
degradation increases as the CEO’s prior experience is “further away” from the current firm and
the more reliant the firm is on R&D. Both studies indicate outside CEOs may be detrimental to
firm innovation but we do not know the direction outside CEOs take innovation.
The extant literature reveals that hiring an inside versus an outside CEO may have a
profound impact on innovation. Indeed, the literature documents the importance of hiring
external CEOs during organizational change (Virany et al., 1992; Zhang and Rajagopalan, 2010).
Outside CEOs have a different professional experience, which means that external hires have
different knowledge sets, professional networks, and life experiences that change the way those
professionals interpret and process information. Additionally, CEOs with more career variety
tend to exhibit higher strategic dynamism (Crossland et al., 2014). Those differences should help
an outside CEO spot complementarities not seen by internal members of a firm and act upon
those new discoveries, inducing firms that hire outside CEOs to explore more. More exploration
should manifest as bigger changes in innovation direction, which leads to the first hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: Firms with outside CEOs will exhibit more change in innovation direction than
firms with inside CEOs.
Given that outside CEOs seem to have a negative impact on firm innovation but may bring
benefits to the firm in other areas, it is in the interest of the firm to understand ways in which to
govern the CEO to maximize the potential positive aspects while minimizing the negative

94

aspects. One potential impact of the CEO’s influence on firm innovation is R&D structure.
Research has investigated the potential impact of the firm’s centralized versus decentralized
R&D structure decision (Argyres and Silverman, 2004; Arora, Belenzon, and Rios, 2011, 2014;
Knott, 2017; Leiponen and Helfat, 2011). CEOs have much more control in a centralized R&D
structure due to direct oversight of the R&D organization and control of budgets. The impact of
CEO influence over R&D is empirically demonstrated by Lerner and Wulf (2007) in showing
CEO incentive compensation only has a significant effect on innovation if the firm’s R&D
structure is centralized. These insights lead to our second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The impact of outside CEOs in directing innovation will decrease in magnitude
with R&D decentralization.
Outside CEOs also come with heterogeneous prior experience which may impact their new
firm’s innovation direction (Harris and Helfat, 1997). The applicability of prior experience to
help spot innovation complementarities that lead to a shift in innovation direction may differ
with the relation of the CEOs prior firm experience compared to the new firm. For example,
CEOs that have outside experience within the same industry may have accumulated the
technological expertise to recognize and capitalize on innovative opportunities in that industry.
Conversely, CEOs hired with more remote technological experience may lack the expertise to
lead the firm in a new technological direction but may make changes to other aspects of the firm
(e.g. marketing, manufacturing, etc.) that conform more to the general skills that they bring. We
expect this heterogeneous experience to translate into innovation direction in accordance with
Hypothesis 3:
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Hypothesis 3: The impact of outside CEOs in directing innovation will decrease as prior
experience becomes more remote from the current firm.
Other aspects of the firm’s innovation are also likely to affect the CEO’s ability to control
the firm’s innovation direction and not all firms are suited for a change in innovation directed by
outside CEOs. Firms that produce significant innovation quantities usually have a stable
organizational structure that manages that innovation. In those firms, CEOs have little discretion
to change the innovation direction in an impactful way for multiple reasons. First, those tend to
be large firms, likely with Chief Technology Officers and other employees in charge of the
R&D. Second, firms with significant innovation in process usually have many projects in
different stages of maturation in the pipeline. This increases the inertia of the firm, increasing the
difficulty of shifting innovation toward a new path. Hypothesis 4 summarizes this discussion.
Hypothesis 4: The impact of outside CEOs in directing innovation direction will decrease in
magnitude with the amount of R&D produced in the firm.

3.3 Data and Methods
The main objective of the chapter is to understand how outside CEOs influence the
direction of the firm’s innovation. To do that, we rely on the following specification:
(Δ in innovation direction) i, t+1 =β1 (Outside CEO) i, t + β2 (Controls) i,t + η i + λ t + ε i, t

(3.1)

The model in (3.1) uses firm fixed effects (η) and year fixed effects (λ) alongside a set of
control variables to distinguish the relationship between hiring an outside CEO in year t and the
change in the direction of innovation in year t+1. To calculate the direction of innovation, we use
the patent’s main technology classification. Each patent has a main technology classification that
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indicates the technical content of the innovation claimed by the patent. Thus, by looking at how
the technical mix of patents changes year to year, we hope to gain insight into the firm’s
direction of innovation. To operationalize that change, we aggregate the number of a given
firm’s patent applications in a year for each technology classification. This operation generates a
vector for each firm-year that has dimensions equal to the number of possible technical
classifications. Each entry in this vector corresponds to how many patent applications in that
specific technology classification the firm has made in a particular year.
To generate differences in innovation direction, we calculate one minus the cosine distance
to indicate how far away two innovation portfolios are from one another. The further away are
the vectors, the higher is the technological distance between them. The formula to calculate the
distance between the vectors A and B in an N-dimensional technology classification is described
by equation (3.2) below.
N
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Figure 3.2 illustrates the idea captured by equation (3.2). In that representation, there are only
two technological classifications. In year T the firm applied for three patents with technology
classification 1 and one patent with technology classification 2, resulting in the vector (3,1). In
the next year, the firm applied for three patents with technology classification 1 and three patent
with technology classification 2, that is, vector (3,3). The distance between the vectors is 1 minus
the cosine of angle α, approximately 0.1. If the firm had a vector of (3,2) in year T+1 instead, the
measure would have decreased to 0.03.
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-------------------------------------------Insert Figure 3.2 about here
--------------------------------------------Since all vectors are non-negative, the distance as calculated above yields a number
between 0 (identical vectors) and 1 (orthogonal vectors). The benefit of using a measure based
on the cosine distance is that the scale of patenting does not affect the measure since the distance
between a vector and n times that same vector is zero. We calculate not only the change in vector
direction within the same firm over time but also the distance between a firm’s vector and the
average vector composed of the other firms in the industry.
To measure the size of the innovation vector itself, we use the Euclidean norm. The norm is
more akin to the amount of innovation taking place in the firm, instead of the overall direction as
in the case of the cosine measure. With the cosine distance and the norm, we have a complete
picture of the innovation change between the two periods.
We use three main sources of data: Execucomp, Compustat, and the USPTO database.
Execucomp data allows us to identify up to five top executives in each firm. Compustat provides
firm information and the USPTO contains patent information. We match the USPTO database
with Compustat using fuzzy string matching of company name and patent application assignee.
Execucomp is matched with Compustat using the Standard & Poor’s firm identification. In total,
the dataset spans from 1992 to 2017.
The main independent variable, Outside CEO, is a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO
was in a different firm two years prior his/her CEO appointment14. To identify previous
The reason for the two year lag is to take care of CEOs hired from outside to groom them for CEO, i.e. the “heir
apparent” problem (Harris and Helfat, 1997).
14

98

appointments, we classify CEOs as outsiders if they are present in the Execucomp dataset as
working for a different firm two years before their appointment. To that, we added the outside
CEOs manually compiled by Cummings and Knott (2018). In the end, we have 309 outside
CEOs and 1616 CEOs hired from within the firm. This dataset has a proportion of outside CEOs
around 16%, lower than similar calculations in the literature. There are two reasons for this
difference. First, many firms were shed in the assignee name matching process. Although
selection likely in that sample, a credible story of why it would bias the results is difficult to
generate. Second, we only look at firms that patent. The fact that not all technologically
innovative firms patent is a known limitation intrinsic to all studies using patenting.
With respect to control variables, we first consider the R&D intensity of the firm. This
allows us to control for resources available to the firm employed in innovation. To control for the
total amount of available resources, we add revenue growth of the prior two years. We also
control for CEO incentives using salary. Additionally, the regressions control for the distance
between the firm’s current technological vector and the vector composed by the average firm in
the firm’s industry. This controls for the uniqueness of the firm’s innovation portfolio in relation
to its competition. Finally, we control for the number of patent applications and the average
number of claims each patent application makes. This controls for the firm’s propensity to patent
and how broad the patents tend to be.
As mentioned before, the chapter generates the independent variable based on the firm’s
technological vector. We use the Cooperative Patent Classification technology classification at
the subclass level, yielding 638 possible technological classifications. Although there are finer
classifications, using them would not provide additional insight into innovation change. Because
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the measure used here gives equal weight for all differences in technology, we need the
classifications to have a meaningful impact on innovation direction.
We also utilize two measures of firm R&D structure based on the geographic location of
the firm’s patent inventors which proxy for the control that the CEO exerts over the firm’s R&D
organization (Cummings, 2018). We use USPTO patent data to identify the home location of
each individual inventor of patents assigned to a firm. The first R&D structure measure is the
proportion of the firm’s inventors that are located in the most frequent census-based statistical
area (CBSA). Thus, the proxy measures the geographic agglomeration of the firm’s inventors.
The second R&D structure measure takes into account the potential that the geographic
agglomeration is spread over multiple CBSAs by calculating a Herfindahl index of the
concentration of a firm’s inventors in the five most frequent CBSAs. The geographic
agglomeration of R&D increases with each measure. Prior research has utilized firm inventor
geographic agglomeration as a measure of informal R&D structure (Singh, 2008). This chapter
also utilizes the proxy as a measure of formal R&D structure which is supported by its robust
correlation with measures for patent type (Leiponen and Helfat, 2011) and impact (Singh, 2008),
consistent with formal R&D structure (Argyres and Silverman, 2004; Knott, 2017).
The dependent variable, Vector change (prior year), is the vector distance between year t+1
and t, whereas Norm change measures the change in the norm. We also discuss the change in the
firm’s technology direction in relation to the industry average vector in year t, represented by
Vector dist., (mean ind.). Finally, we censored observations that had R&D intensity and revenue
growth over two years higher than 3 times the 99th percentile of each variable. Censoring
extreme observations is to reduce the impact of extreme outliers in the data. The appendix
contains the regressions using the full dataset. The main results remain similar, and any relevant
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discrepancy is addressed in the text. The summary statistics for the restricted sample is displayed
in Table 3.1.
-------------------------------------------Insert Table 3.1 about here
---------------------------------------------

3.4 Empirical Results
Table 3.2 shows the results from estimations of equation (3.1). The table presents the correlation
between Outside CEOs and the change in innovation direction. The first column is the baseline,
without the addition of the Outside CEO dummy. The distance between the innovation vector of
the firm and the mean vector of the industry is positive and significant. This suggests that firms
with a research portfolio different than their peers in the industry tend to shift the direction of
innovation more robustly. If we interpret more change in the innovation vector as more
exploration, this means that more unique firms tend to explore more than firms that are similar to
the industry average. Similar ideas are shown in the literature, linking technological diversity of
alliance partners and exploratory innovation (Phelps, 2010).
-------------------------------------------Insert Table 3.2 about here
--------------------------------------------Columns (2) to (4) include the correlation of Outside CEOs to change of innovation direction.
The models show the influence of firm and year fixed effects on the Outside CEO coefficient.
Column (4) is the main specification used to test hypothesis 1 since it includes both firm and
year effects, as well as clustered standard errors at the firm level. This regression indicates that a
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firm headed by an outside CEO correlates with a lesser shift in innovation direction than if it
were managed by an inside CEO. Comparing to the mean change in year-to-year innovation
direction, having an outside CEO decreases change in direction by about 10%. Columns (5) to
(8) show that this result is robust to inclusions of yearly revenue growth and measures of
centralization to control for firm organizational structure. These regressions strongly reject
hypothesis 1, which is the expectation that outside CEOs generate more innovation change.
Table 3.3 analyzes the impact of outside CEOs on the innovation vector’s norm (1) and
on the distance between the firm and industry (2). Although outside CEOs tends to decrease the
change in innovation direction, they seem to increase the vector norm. Outside CEOs tend to
manage firms that have a more focused and deeper innovation portfolio. Column (2) shows that
they are also not inclined to deviate from the average innovation direction of the industry. One
possible explanation for mimicking other firms in the industry is the lack of expertise of outside
CEOs (Cummings and Knott, 2018).
-------------------------------------------Insert Table 3.3 about here
--------------------------------------------Hypothesis 2 argues that if we believe hiring an outsider is creating the effects shown, we
expect that those effects are stronger the more power the CEO has to control the direction of
innovation. To test that idea, we calculate the median of two centralization measures
(Cummings, 2018) and analyze the impact of outside CEOs in the two subsamples: firms with a
high degree of centralization (higher than the median) and firms with a low degree of
centralization (lower than the median). The regressions in Table 3.4 use the two measures of
centralization to test hypothesis 2. Columns (1) and (2) split the sample using the yearly
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Herfindahl index of the firm’s patent inventors in the firm’s five most frequent metropolitan
areas. Columns (3) and (4) use the concentration of the firm’s patent inventors in the single most
frequent metropolitan area. For both measures, centralization increases with the value of the
measure. The coefficient for outside CEO is negative and significant for all high centralization
subsamples. For low centralization, the estimates are not precise and have higher coefficients.
We utilize an unpaired t-test to analyze the difference in coefficients across subsamples. T-test
results reveal a statistically significant difference between the Outside CEO coefficients in
columns 1 and 2 (p=0.018) while not revealing a significant difference between the Outside CEO
coefficients in columns 3 and 4. Thus, we find moderate support for hypothesis 2.
-------------------------------------------Insert Table 3.4 about here
--------------------------------------------We perform the same analysis for the innovation vector norm and distance to the
industry. Tables 3.5 and 3.6 show that the correlation of outside CEOs with those dependent
variables is much less clear since most of the coefficients for Outside CEO are not precisely
estimated. T-tests also reveal no significant difference across subsample coefficients in each
table. However, the increase in norm is more pronounced in firms with high centralization if we
use the Herfindahl index and concentration of inventors in metropolitan areas.
-------------------------------------------Insert Tables 3.5 and 3.6 about here
--------------------------------------------Thus far, we have presented circumstantial evidence that outside CEOs decrease the
change in the direction of innovation. If that is indeed the case, we should expect that the more
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“outside” the CEO is, the higher is going to be its impact. In other words, the further away the
CEO’s experience, the lower is the CEO expertise. This is likely to magnify the innovation
direction impact. Table 3.7 splits the sample of CEOs into two categories: CEOs coming from a
firm further away than the median distance between the current and previous firm and CEOs
coming from firms nearer than the median. CEOs from more distant firms tend to decrease the
direction of innovation change more than CEOs coming from firms with innovation portfolios
similar to the current firm. T-tests reveal a significant difference in the coefficients across
subsamples (p = 0.0228). This finding corroborates hypothesis 3.
-------------------------------------------Insert Table 3.7 about here
--------------------------------------------Again, we perform the same analysis for the norm and distance to the industry. Tables 3.8
and 3.9 show the results. The analysis of the norm change does not show a significant coefficient
for outsiders. T-tests reveal only a marginal difference in subsample coefficients in Table 3.8 and
no statistical difference in subsample coefficients in Table 3.9. Compatible with the idea of lack
of expertise, CEOs from distant firms tend to work for firms that move closer to the industry’s
average innovation vector.
-------------------------------------------Insert Tables 3.8 and 3.9 about here
--------------------------------------------Finally, hypothesis 4 speculates that the impact of outside CEOs will decrease with
increasing R&D intensity. Table 3.10 splits the sample into firms with high and low R&D
intensity in relation to the median. Regressions in columns 1 and 2 reveal a statistically
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significant correlation of Outside CEO to decreased change with low R&D intensity firms.
Conversely, the relationship is not significant in the high R&D intensity subsample. Although
this conforms to the intuition of Hypothesis 4, a t-test reveals no significant statistical difference
between the two coefficients (p=0.3023). Thus, we cannot claim support of Hypothesis 4 in the
data. We obtain similar results with the effect of outside CEOs on the norm and distance to
industry’s innovation vector: only the coefficients for firms with low R&D intensity are
significant. However, the t-test does reveal significant differences (p=0.0442) in the subsample
coefficients in columns 3 and 4. We note here that the regressions using the full sample do not
support the higher impact of outside CEOs in firms with low R&D intensity, so we advocate
caution in interpreting the results.
-------------------------------------------Insert Table 3.10 about here
---------------------------------------------

3.5 Robustness Tests
The analysis of an outside CEO’s impact raises concerns about endogeneity issues. More
specifically, firms do not choose CEOs randomly. This opens the door for unobserved
characteristics to influence both the direction of innovation and the choice of outside CEO. To
help assuage the issue, we utilized a propensity score matching model. Following the example of
Cummings and Knott (2018), we use the log of revenues minus cost of goods sold to proxy for
performance, firm growth in two years to indicate internal resources, revenues to control for lack
of internal candidates, and R&D spending to control for the need of expertise. Table 3.11 reports
these results. The propensity score matching model corroborates the main results by showing a
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negative relationship between outside CEOs and innovation change. Although the average
treatment effect is negative and significant, we recognize that our analysis cannot account for all
the possible sources of endogeneity. Thus, we caution interpreting the results as causal.
-------------------------------------------Insert Table 3.11 about here
--------------------------------------------Finally, we run a placebo test by calculating the percentage of outside CEOs in the data
and generating 100 samples randomly assigning the outside CEO indication. For each sample,
we run the same regression as shown in Table 3.2, column (4). Figure 3.3 shows the coefficients
for Outside CEO and the 95% confidence intervals for the placebo tests and the data. Results
visually show that the actual model is the most extreme result compared to the 100 random
assignment models. In other words, the negative correlation of outside CEOs to innovation is the
most robust in the actual data compared to the random assignment of the independent variable.
Thus, the placebo test shows that the association between outside CEOs and the vector distance
is not occurring because of some mechanical property of the way we measure innovation change.
-------------------------------------------Insert Figure 3.3 about here
---------------------------------------------

3.6 Conclusion and Implications
In this chapter, we sought to further understand the potential impact of CEOs hired from outside
the firm on the dynamics of the firm’s innovation. We utilized Execucomp to determine each
CEO’s prior experience (outside or inside the firm) and USPTO patent data to construct a multi106

dimensional vector based on the firm’s patent characteristics. Contrary to expectations, our
results provide circumstantial evidence that firms with outside CEOs have less dynamic
innovation in comparison to firms with inside CEOs. More specifically, we find that the angle of
the firm’s patent vector changes less when the firm’s CEO is from outside. These results are
strengthened with the use of a propensity score matching model as well as with supplementary
results finding a larger relationship magnitude with subsamples that proxy for centralized R&D
and more remote prior experience. In particular, the results associated with R&D structure
provide circumstantial support that the effect is CEO driven. When the weight of the results are
taken in aggregate, there are implications for managerial dynamic capabilities with respect to
innovation (Helfat and Martin, 2015). However, we caution interpreting the results as causal for
multiple reasons including the lack of random assignment of CEOs to firms and the imperfect
nature of patents as a proxy for innovation.
Although the main findings come as a surprise, the results conform to prior literature that
indicates outside CEOs lack the technological expertise to make optimal strategic innovation
decisions (Balsmeier and Buchwald, 2014; Cummings and Knott, 2018). More specifically,
Cummings and Knott (2018) find that firms with outside CEOs respond less to CEO incentive
compensation which is interpreted to signal that they do not know what project to fund. The
results of the current chapter may also indicate that outside CEOs do not know where to invest
R&D, which leads to less dynamic firm innovation. We also caution against interpreting the
results to indicate the prior literature is incorrect in stating that firms bring in outside CEOs to
usher strategic organizational change. However, this change may occur in the new CEO’s area
of expertise other than innovation. Outside CEOs bring with them more general skills (Murphy
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and Zabojnik, 2007) which may translate into a strategic change in marketing, sales,
manufacturing, etc., rather than innovation.
This chapter has multiple implications for firms. First, the results indicate that the choice
of outside CEOs affects innovation strategy. However, overall performance takes into account
many other factors for which outside CEOs may excel; therefore, firms should generate CEO
succession decisions based on the potential effect on innovation as well as these other factors.
Second, results indicate that firms may be able to minimize the innovation impact of outside
CEOs with complementary R&D structure decisions while taking advantage of other positive
aspects outside CEOs bring to the table. We speculate that an R&D structure that lessens the
CEO’s control over innovation may be advantageous for firms with outside CEOs.
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3.8 Figures and Tables
Figure 3.1: Proportion of CEO Hires from Outside: 1970-2013

Figure 3.2: Change in innovation direction
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Figure 3.3: Placebo test
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics
VARIABLES
Outside CEO
Vector change, (prior year)
Norm change, (prior year)
Vector change, (mean ind.)
Growth, (2 yrs)
salary
Patent applications
Avg. num. claims
R&D intensity

(1)
N

(2)
mean

(3)
sd

(4)
min

(5)
max

7,029
6,883
7,029
7,029
7,029
7,029
7,029
7,029
7,029

0.142
0.290
0.0633
0.403
0.371
680.0
119.6
19.69
0.155

0.349
0.302
59.17
0.289
1.014
409.8
486.8
9.101
0.403

0
0
-2,710
0
-0.941
0
1
0
0

1
1
2,112
1.000
18.82
5,500
12,271
198
7.158
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Table 3.2: Outside CEOs decrease change in innovation direction

VARIABLES
R&D intensity
salary
Avg. num. claims
Vector change, (mean ind.)
Patent applications
Growth, (2 yrs)

(1)
Vector
change
(prior year)

(2)
Vector
change
(prior year)

(3)
Vector
change
(prior year)

(4)
Vector
change
(prior year)

(5)
Vector
change
(prior year)

(6)
Vector
change
(prior year)

(7)
Vector
change
(prior year)

-0.0166*
(0.00997)
5.75e-06
(1.40e-05)
-0.000682
(0.000469)
0.489***
(0.0289)
-1.76e-05
(1.12e-05)
-0.00348
(0.00292)

-0.0164
(0.01000)
1.23e-05
(1.24e-05)
-0.000761*
(0.000438)
0.490***
(0.0282)
-2.35e-05*
(1.26e-05)
-0.00448
(0.00296)

-0.0485***
(0.0115)
1.15e-05
(1.71e-05)
-0.00104*
(0.000592)
0.480***
(0.0250)
-5.19e-05*
(2.65e-05)
-0.0148***
(0.00383)

-0.0167*
(0.0101)
4.94e-06
(1.36e-05)
-0.000695
(0.000469)
0.487***
(0.0286)
-2.00e-05*
(1.10e-05)
-0.00362
(0.00293)

-0.0329***
(0.0114)

-0.0406**
(0.0163)

-0.0321***
(0.0116)

-0.0177*
(0.00993)
4.85e-06
(1.36e-05)
-0.000692
(0.000470)
0.488***
(0.0286)
-1.99e-05*
(1.10e-05)
-0.00176
(0.00308)
-0.00742
(0.00527)
-0.0320***
(0.0116)

-0.0113
(0.00991)
1.75e-05
(1.40e-05)
-0.000528
(0.000477)
0.482***
(0.0319)
-1.80e-05
(1.11e-05)
-0.00118
(0.00324)
-0.00404
(0.00590)
-0.0305**
(0.0119)
0.0336
(0.0206)

-0.0116
(0.00990)
1.76e-05
(1.40e-05)
-0.000530
(0.000477)
0.485***
(0.0318)
-1.81e-05
(1.11e-05)
-0.00108
(0.00325)
-0.00405
(0.00593)
-0.0304**
(0.0120)

Growth, (prior yr)
Outside CEO
Herfindal Centralization
CSA Concentration

0.0307
(0.0207)

Observations
5,767
5,767
5,833
5,767
R-squared
0.623
0.621
0.281
0.623
Firm FE
YES
YES
NO
YES
Year FE
YES
NO
YES
YES
Num. firms
570
570
636
570
Note: Standard errors clustered by firms in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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5,767
0.623
YES
YES
570

5,096
0.629
YES
YES
481

5,096
0.629
YES
YES
481

Table 3.3: Outside CEO’s impact on norm and firm uniqueness

VARIABLES
R&D intensity
salary
Avg. num. claims
Vector change, (mean ind.)

(1)
Norm change
(prior year)

(2)
Vector change
(mean ind.)

-1.488**
(0.669)
-0.00291
(0.0101)
0.0882**
(0.0374)
4.981**
(2.180)

-0.0276
(0.502)
9.845**
(4.566)

0.00288
(0.00941)
7.08e-07
(1.04e-05)
-0.000360
(0.000379)
0.305***
(0.0328)
-3.69e-05**
(1.69e-05)
-0.00133
(0.00217)
-0.0185*
(0.0108)

5,767
0.026
YES
YES
570

5,767
0.758
YES
YES
570

Patent applications
Growth, (2 yrs)
Outside CEO

Observations
R-squared
Firm FE
Year FE
Num. firms

Note: Standard errors clustered by firms in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.4: CEO impact on innovation direction is higher in centralized firms

VARIABLES
R&D intensity
salary
Avg. num. claims
Vector change, (mean
ind.)
Patent applications
Growth, (2 yrs)
Outside CEO

Observations
R-squared
Firm FE
Year FE
Centralization
Num. firms

(1)
Vector change
(prior year)

(2)
Vector change
(prior year)

(3)
Vector change
(prior year)

(4)
Vector change
(prior year)

-0.00780
(0.0145)
1.08e-06
(2.13e-05)
-0.000666
(0.000659)
0.521***

-0.0276**
(0.0119)
1.65e-05
(1.91e-05)
-0.000787
(0.000661)
0.444***

-0.00780
(0.0142)
-2.78e-06
(1.96e-05)
-0.000856
(0.000682)
0.495***

-0.0259**
(0.0118)
1.87e-05
(1.97e-05)
-0.000596
(0.000633)
0.476***

(0.0398)
-1.57e-05
(1.98e-05)
-0.00774*
(0.00408)
-0.0600***
(0.0182)

(0.0391)
-1.69e-05
(1.30e-05)
0.00150
(0.00450)
-0.00659
(0.0140)

(0.0429)
-1.22e-05
(1.47e-05)
-0.00629*
(0.00329)
-0.0462***
(0.0171)

(0.0375)
-2.21e-05
(1.67e-05)
0.00106
(0.00557)
-0.0175
(0.0153)

2,588
0.619
YES
YES
High Herfindal
Centralization
303

3,179
0.621
YES
YES
Low Herfindal
Centralization
267

2,695
0.640
YES
YES
High CSA
Concentration
302

3,072
0.611
YES
YES
Low CSA
Concentration
268

Note: Standard errors clustered by firms in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: t-test of Outside CEO coefficients in columns 1 and 2 shows statistically significant difference, p = 0.0181
Note: t-test of Outside CEO coefficients in columns 3 and 4 shows difference not statistically significant, p = 0.2097
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Table 3.5: Outside CEOs and norm change, centralized firms

VARIABLES
R&D intensity
salary
Avg. num. claims
Vector change, (mean
ind.)
Growth, (2 yrs)
Outside CEO

Observations
R-squared
Firm FE
Year FE
Centralization
Num. firms

(1)
Norm change
(prior year)

(2)
Norm change
(prior year)

(3)
Norm change
(prior year)

(4)
Norm change
(prior year)

-1.710*
(0.888)
-0.0179
(0.0157)
0.0744
(0.0483)
6.544**

-1.226
(0.960)
0.0104
(0.0127)
0.101
(0.0646)
3.326

-2.508**
(1.100)
-0.0151
(0.0142)
0.0848
(0.0527)
6.125

-0.647
(0.753)
0.00948
(0.0133)
0.0840
(0.0548)
3.795

(3.245)
0.356
(0.345)
12.48*
(6.719)

(2.891)
-0.0711
(0.716)
8.454
(6.448)

(3.783)
0.572
(0.441)
13.32**
(6.189)

(2.339)
-0.647
(0.722)
7.914
(6.889)

2,588
0.090
YES
YES
High Herfindal
Centralization
303

3,179
0.024
YES
YES
Low Herfindal
Centralization
267

2,695
0.092
YES
YES
High CSA
Concentration
302

3,072
0.021
YES
YES
Low CSA
Concentration
268

Note: Standard errors clustered by firms in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Coefficients are not statistically different across subsamples
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Table 3.6: Outside CEOs and distance from industry, centralized firms

VARIABLES
R&D intensity
salary
Avg. num. claims
Vector change, (mean
ind.)
Patent applications
Growth, (2 yrs)
Outside CEO

Observations
R-squared
Firm FE
Year FE
Centralization
Num. firms

(1)
Vector change
(mean ind.)

(2)
Vector change
(mean ind.)

(3)
Vector change
(mean ind.)

(4)
Vector change
(mean ind.)

0.0136
(0.0121)
2.11e-06
(1.46e-05)
-0.000193
(0.000534)
0.232***

-0.00493
(0.0162)
3.17e-06
(1.50e-05)
-0.000609
(0.000549)
0.378***

0.0137
(0.0121)
-9.48e-07
(1.30e-05)
-0.000354
(0.000550)
0.226***

-0.00535
(0.0163)
5.76e-06
(1.61e-05)
-0.000407
(0.000516)
0.372***

(0.0457)
-6.70e-05***
(1.64e-05)
-0.000419
(0.00244)
-0.0302
(0.0208)

(0.0454)
-2.49e-05*
(1.48e-05)
-0.00187
(0.00357)
-0.00764
(0.0107)

(0.0482)
-5.14e-05***
(1.74e-05)
0.000136
(0.00232)
-0.0311
(0.0192)

(0.0434)
-2.85e-05
(1.86e-05)
-0.00327
(0.00400)
-0.00590
(0.0120)

2,588
0.735
YES
YES
High Herfindal
Centralization
303

3,179
0.776
YES
YES
Low Herfindal
Centralization
267

2,695
0.755
YES
YES
High CSA
Concentration
302

3,072
0.765
YES
YES
Low CSA
Concentration
268

Note: Standard errors clustered by firms in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: Coefficients are not statistically different across subsamples
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Table 3.7: CEO impact on innovation direction is higher when they come from more distant firms

VARIABLES
R&D intensity
salary
Avg. num. claims
Vector change, (mean ind.)
Patent applications
Growth, (2 yrs)
Outside CEO

Observations
R-squared
Firm FE
Year FE
Previous firm distance
Num. firms

(1)
Vector change
(prior year)

(2)
Vector change
(prior year)

-0.0178*
(0.0103)
1.40e-05
(1.82e-05)
-0.000776
(0.000531)
0.488***
(0.0343)
-5.00e-05*
(2.90e-05)
-0.00455
(0.00305)
-0.0385**
(0.0162)

-0.0387
(0.0369)
7.61e-07
(1.61e-05)
-0.000599
(0.000888)
0.414***
(0.0618)
-8.55e-06
(6.00e-06)
-0.00630
(0.0131)
0.0232
(0.0155)

4,057
1,677
0.619
0.702
YES
YES
YES
YES
High Distance previous firm Low Distance previous firm
531
210

Note: Standard errors clustered by firms in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note; t-test of Outside CEO coefficients in columns 1 and 2 shows statistically significant difference, p = 0.0228
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Table 3.8: Outside CEOs and norm change, previous firm distance

VARIABLES
R&D intensity
salary
Avg. num. claims
Vector change, (mean ind.)
Growth, (2 yrs)
Outside CEO

Observations
R-squared
Firm FE
Year FE
Previous firm distance
Num. firms

(1)
Norm change
(prior year)

(2)
Norm change
(prior year)

-0.518
(0.535)
0.00319
(0.00343)
0.00387
(0.0251)
0.630
(2.700)
0.594*
(0.357)
2.807
(2.028)

-7.000
(11.39)
0.00847
(0.0257)
0.473*
(0.246)
23.10*
(11.86)
3.290
(6.180)
15.17
(9.917)

4,057
1,677
0.159
0.042
YES
YES
YES
YES
High Distance previous firm Low Distance previous firm
531
210

Note: Standard errors clustered by firms in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: t-test shows marginally statistical difference across subsamples (p=0.0822)
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Table 3.9: Outside CEOs and distance from industry, previous firm distance

VARIABLES
R&D intensity
salary
Avg. num. claims
Vector change, (mean ind.)
Patent applications
Growth, (2 yrs)
Outside CEO

Observations
R-squared
Firm FE
Year FE
Previous firm distance
Num. firms

(1)
Vector change
(mean ind.)

(2)
Vector change
(mean ind.)

-0.00150
(0.0100)
1.07e-05
(1.76e-05)
-0.000264
(0.000383)
0.238***
(0.0419)
-7.93e-05**
(3.98e-05)
-0.00364
(0.00237)
-0.0331**
(0.0137)

0.0519*
(0.0292)
-2.26e-05
(1.48e-05)
-0.000149
(0.000931)
0.255***
(0.0630)
-1.85e-05*
(9.53e-06)
-0.00689
(0.0105)
-0.0131
(0.0304)

4,057
1,677
0.771
0.772
YES
YES
YES
YES
High Distance previous firm Low Distance previous firm
531
210

Note: Standard errors clustered by firms in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: t-test shows no significant difference between Outside CEO coefficient in subsamples (p=0.4892)
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Table 3.10: Impact of outside CEOs for high and low R&D intensity firms

VARIABLES

(1)
(2)
Vector
Vector
change
change
(prior year) (prior year)

(3)
Norm
change
(prior
year)

R&D intensity

-0.0198**
1.033
-0.992
(0.00987)
(0.628)
(0.663)
salary
2.41e-05
-1.20e-05
0.00126
(2.04e-05) (1.81e-05) (0.00484)
Avg. num. claims -0.000339 -0.00164** 0.0983*
(0.000603) (0.000740) (0.0515)
Vector change,
0.407***
0.566***
1.501
(mean ind.)
(0.0385)
(0.0430)
(3.534)
Patent
-2.08e-05 -1.92e-05*
applications
(2.20e-05) (1.01e-05)
Growth, (2 yrs)
-0.00509*
0.00570
0.00888
(0.00291)
(0.0153)
(0.295)
Outside CEO
-0.0192
-0.0439**
2.815
(0.0131)
(0.0215)
(1.880)
Observations
R-squared
Firm FE
Year FE
R&D intensity
Num. firms

3,322
0.557
YES
YES
High
319

2,445
0.646
YES
YES
Low
251

3,322
0.078
YES
YES
High
319

(4)
Norm
change
(prior
year)

(5)
(6)
Vector
Vector
change
change
(mean ind.) (mean ind.)

-175.9
(164.6)
-0.00581
(0.0174)
0.0563
(0.0561)
9.001***

-4.47e-05
(0.00989)
-1.03e-05
(1.71e-05)
-0.000266
(0.000433)
0.295***

0.342
(0.540)
1.69e-05
(1.10e-05)
-0.000621
(0.000717)
0.292***

(2.772)

(0.0479)
-3.55e-05*

-1.621
(4.648)
20.59**
(9.972)

(0.0435)
-4.94e05***
(1.77e-05)
-0.00185
(0.00220)
-0.00205
(0.0126)

2,445
0.025
YES
YES
Low
251

3,322
0.775
YES
YES
High
319

2,445
0.744
YES
YES
Low
251

(1.88e-05)
-0.0143
(0.0109)
-0.0370*
(0.0203)

Note: Standard errors clustered by firms in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: t-test shows no significant different in Outside CEO coefficients in column 1 and 2 (p=0.3023)
Note: t-test shows significant difference in Outside CEO coefficients in column 3 and 4 (p = 0.0442)
Note: t-test shows no significant difference in Outside CEO coefficients in column 5 and 6 (p=0.1250)

Table 3.11: Propensity score matching
Coefficient
Robust SD
p-value
95% Confidence Interval
ATE
Outsider
-0.03778
0.01275
0.003
-0.06277
-0.0128
(1 vs 0)
Note: Logit as treatment model. Outcome is vector change in year t+1, as before.
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Appendix A – Chapter 1 Supplemental Analyses
Table A1.1: Relationship of Innovation to Employee Promotion

Table A1.2: Panel A – Relationship of Publishing to Employee Promotion

Table A1.2: Panel B – Relationship of Patenting to Employee Promotion
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Table A1.3: Relationship of Promotion Reward to Innovation

Table A1.4: Relationship of Promotion Reward to Publications
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Table A1.5: Relationship of Promotion Reward to Publications

Table A1.6: Relationship of Promotion Reward to Patents
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Table A1.7: Relationship of Promotion Reward to Patents

Table A1.8: Relationship of Promotion Reward to Lagged Innovation
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Table A1.9: Impact of Collaboration

Table A1.10: Relationship of Promotion Reward to Collaboration
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Appendix B – Chapter 1 Supplemental Figures
Figure B1.1: Distribution of NASA Employees by Age and Education
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Figure B1.2a: Distribution of Jobs at NASA

Figure B1.2b: Sub-distribution of Engineering Jobs at NASA
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Figure B1.2c: Sub-distribution of Science Jobs at NASA

Figure B1.2d: Sub-distribution of Math-Tech Jobs at NASA
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Figure B1.3a: Heterogeneity in Innovation Across Engineering Jobs

Figure B1.3b: Heterogeneity in Innovation Across Science Jobs
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Figure B1.4: Innovation Collaboration Across Job Types

Figure B1.5: Federal Employee Survey Results
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Mean Value by Agency: Promotions in my work group are based on merit (Q22)
Federal Trade Commission
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Office of Management and Budget
Department of Commerce
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
All Other Agencies
National Science Foundation
General Services Administration
Office of Personnel Management
Securities and Exchange Commission
National Credit Union Administration
Department of Health and Human Services
National Labor Relations Board
Railroad Retirement Board
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Federal Communications Commission
Department of Labor
Department of State
Department of Energy
Environmental Protection Agency
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Department of Education
National Archives and Records Administration
Department of the Interior
Department of Justice
Department of Transportation
OSD, Joint Staff, Defense Agencies, and Field Activities
United States Department of the Navy
Department of Housing and Urban Development
United States Department of the Army
Small Business Administration
Department of Agriculture
Department of the Treasury
Social Security Administration
United States Department of the Air Force
Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency
U.S. Agency for International Development
National Gallery of Art
Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Department of Veterans Affairs
Department of Homeland Security
Broadcasting Board of Governors
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Source: 2017 Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey

Figure B1.6: Yearly Promotion Across Job Types
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5

Figure B1.7: Most Frequent Journal Publications by NASA Employees
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